60 THE SEVEN BOOKS OF [Book rr.
ness of men: for how shall any one be restrained even by the fear of a
higher power, who is persuaded that his life cannot be cut short by any
power (29)? while if he is threatened with the punishments of the
infernal regions, he will laugh them to scorn, knowing that what is in-
corruptible cannot be affected by mere bodily ills. If the soul is im-
mortal, Arnobius affirms there is no need or ground for philosophy, that
is, ethics, whose purpose is to raise man above the brutish pleasures of
sense to a virtuous life: for why should not a soul which cannot perish
give itself up to any pleasures? while if the soul is mortal, philosophy is
in precisely the same position, aiming to do for man what will not profit
him if done (30). The soul, he concludes, is neither mortal nor im-
mortal (31) ; and there is therefore good reason that those who have no
confidence in their power to help themselves, should welcome a saviour
in one more powerful (32, 33). Christians and heathen alike, then,
look for the deliverance of their souls from death; and neither party,
therefore, has any reason to mock the other in this (33, 34). Such, too,
is the condition of all spirits which are supposed to exist (35); and it
is only through God's goodness that any spirit becomes immortal (36).
It is next argued at great length, and with some prolixity, that the soul
is not sprung from God, on the ground of its vicious and imperfect
nature (387-46) ; and it is then shown that, in denying the soul’s divine
origin on this ground, we are acting most reasonably, although we cannot
say what its real origin is (47, 48) ; while if any one attempts to show
that the soul is not imperfect and polluted by sin by pointing to good
and upright men, he is reminded that the whole race cannot take its
character from a few individual members, and that these men were not
so naturally (49, 50). "There is nothing ridiculous, Arnobius goes on to
say, in confessing ignorance of such matters; and the preceding state-
ments are to a certain extent supported by Plato's authority, in so far as
he separates the formation of man's soul from the divine acts (51, 52).
But if this belief be mistaken, what harm does it do to others (53)?
From this there naturally follows a discussion of the origin of evil, the
existence of which cannot be denied, though its cause is beyond our
knowledge; it is enough to know that all God does is good (54, 55).
How idle a task it would be to attempt the solution of such problems, is
seen when we consider how diverse are the results already arrived at,
and that each is supported on plausible grounds (56, 57) ; which clearly
shows that man's curiosity cannot be certainly satisfied, and that one
man cannot hope to win general assent to his opinions (57). Arnobius
now proposes to his opponents a series of questions as to men and things,
after answering which they may with more reason taunt him with his
ignorance of the soul's origin (58, 59) ; and says that, because of the
vanity of all these inquiries, Christ had commanded them to be laid
aside, and men to strive after the knowledge of God (60), and the
deliverance of their souls from the evils which otherwise await them