a
state which owns no master and is self-regulating, &c. He repeats this, De Hom. Opif. c. 4:
“For the soul immediately shows its royal and exalted character,
far removed from the lowliness of private station, in that it owns no
master, and is self-governed, swayed autocratically by its own
will,—for to whom else does this belong than to a king?”
and c. 16: “Thus, there is in us the principle of all excellence,
all virtue, and every higher thing that we conceive: but pre-eminent
among all is the fact that we are free from necessity, and not in
bondage to any natural force, but have decision in our power as we
please: for virtue is a voluntary thing, subject to no dominion:”
and Orat. Catech. c. 5: “Was it not, then, most right that
that which is in every detail made like the Divine should possess in
its nature a self-ruling and independent principle, such as to enable
the participation of the good to be the reward of its virtue?” It
would be possible to quote similar language from the Neoplatonists
(e.g. Plotinus vi. 83–6): but Gregory learnt the whole bearing
and meaning of moral liberty from none but Origen, whose so-called
“heresies” all flowed from his constant insistence on its
reality.