SECT. XIII.
Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any thing ante-
cedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.
Every act of the Will has a cause, or it has not. If it has a cause, then, according to what
has already been demonstrated, it is not contingent, but necessary; the effect being necessarily
dependent and consequent on its cause, let that cause be what it will. If the cause is the Will
itself, by antecedent acts choosing and determining; still the determined caused act must be
a necessary effect. The act, that is the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its
cause, cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause; but must be wholly subject to its determin-
ation and command, as much as the motions of the hands and feet. The consequent com-
manded acts of the Will are as passive and as necessary, with respect to the antecedent de-
termining acts, as the parts of the body are to the volitions which determine and command
them. And therefore, if all the free acts of the Will are all determined effects determined by
the Will itself, that is by antecedent choice, then they are all necessary; they are all subject
to, and decisively fixed by, the foregoing act, which is their cause: yea, even the determining
act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by another act preceding, if it be a free and
voluntary act; and so must be necessary. So that by this, all the free acts of the Will are ne-
cessary, and cannot be free unless they are necessary: because they cannot be free, according
every being, and in every event where found, by that necessity which is hypothetical only; a necessity resulting
form the nature of things left to their own causal influence; which influence, in any circumstances, will manifest
itself in the way of contrast, of dependence or both united. 28. Again: Volitions are acts of the mind, and each
voluntary act is compounded of a natural and moral quality. The natural quality of a voluntary act proceeds
form decretive necessity; for there is nothing in it but what is good, decreed, and effected by the first cause. The
moral quality of a voluntary act is either good or evil. 29. A voluntary act morally good, is altogether of decretive
necessity, both as to its physical and moral quality; and is therefore foreknown because of decretive appointment
and energy. But a voluntary act morally bad, is partly of decretive, and partly of hypothetical necessity, or that
of consequence. 30. The physical quality of a voluntary act morally bad, is of decretive necessity, and is foreknown
because foreappointed; but the moral quality of the same act, or its badness, is foreknown only by relation,
connexion, or consequence. Thus deformity is the absence of beauty, and may be known by the standard of
beauty from which it deviates. Weakness is the absence of strength, and may be known by relation. A shadow
is known by the interception of rays, and may be known in the same manner. Darkness is caused by the absence
of light, and may be known by the light excluded. 31. How the bad quality of a moral act may be foreknown by
the evidence of relation, will further appear from the consideration of the nature of moral evil itself. For what
is moral, evil, or sin, but what ought not to be, in point of moral obligation? Now for at all knowing, or foreknow-
ing, what ought not to be, which is incapable of being decreed, the proper medium or evidence is the knowledge
of what ought to be. 32. If therefore what ought to be, is known to the omniscient by constituted relations, or
voluntary appointment; what ought not to be may be known by evident consequences.—W.
SECTION XIII. Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.
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SECTION XIII. Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected…