As for the thinkers, the Teacher
went on, outside our own system of thought, they have, with all their
diverse ways of looking at things, one in one point, another in
another, approached and touched the doctrine of the Resurrection: while
they none of them exactly coincide with us, they have in no case wholly
abandoned such an expectation. Some indeed make human nature vile in
their comprehensiveness, maintaining that a soul becomes alternately
that of a man and of something irrational; that it transmigrates into
various bodies, changing at pleasure from the man into fowl, fish, or
beast, and then returning to human kind. While some extend this
absurdity even to trees some extend this absurdity even to trees: Empedocles for instance. Cf. Philosophumena (of Hippolytus,
falsely attributed to Origen), p. 50, where two lines of his are
quoted. Chrysostom’s words (I. iv. p. 196), “There are
those amongst them who carry souls into plants, into shrubs, and into
dogs,” are taken by Matthæus to refer to Empedocles. Cf.
Celsus also (quoted in Origen, c. Cels. viii. 53), “Seeing
then men are born bound to a body—no matter whether the economy
of the world required this, or that they are paying the penalty for
some sin, or that the soul is weighted with certain emotions till it is
purified from them at the end of its destined cycle, three myriad
hours, according to Empedocles, being the necessary period of its
wanderings far away from the Blessed Ones, during which it passes
successively into every perishable shape—we must believe any way
that there exist certain guardians of this prison-house.” See
De Hom. Opif. c. 28. Empedocles can be no other, then, than
“the philosopher who asserts that the same thing may be born in
anything:” below (p. 232 D). Anaxagoras, however, seems to have
indulged in the same dictum (πᾶν ἐν
παντὶ), but with a
difference; as Nicetas explains in his commentary on Gregory Naz.,
Orations: “That everything is contained in everything
Empedocles asserted, and Anaxagoras asserted also: but not with the
same meaning. Empedocles said it of the four elements, namely, that
they are not only divided and self-centred, but are also mingled with
each other. This is clear from the fact that every animal is engendered
by all four. But Anaxagoras, finding an old proverb that nothing can be
produced out of nothing, did away with creation, and introduced
‘differentiation’ instead, &c.” See also Greg.
Naz., Poems, p. 170. and shrubs,
so that they
consider their wooden life as corresponding and akin to humanity,
others of them hold only thus much—that the soul exchanges one
man for another man, so that the life of humanity is continued always
by means of the same souls, which, being exactly the same in number,
are being born perpetually first in one generation, then in another. As
for ourselves, we take our stand upon the tenets of the Church, and
assert that it will be well to accept only so much of these
speculations as is sufficient to show that those who indulge in them
are to a certain extent in accord with the doctrine of the
Resurrection. Their statement, for instance, that the soul after its
release from this body insinuates itself into certain other bodies is
not absolutely out of harmony with the revival which we hope for. For
our view, which maintains that the body, both now, and again in the
future, is composed of the atoms of the universe, is held equally by
these heathens. In fact, you cannot imagine any constitution of the
body independent of a concourse συνδρομῆς of these
atoms. But the divergence lies in this: we assert that the same body
again as before, composed of the same atoms, is compacted around the
soul; they suppose that the soul alights on other bodies, not only
rational, but irrational and even insensate; and while all are agreed
that these bodies which the soul resumes derive their substance from
the atoms of the universe, they part company from us in thinking that
they are not made out of identically the same atoms as those which in
this mortal life grew around the soul. Let then, this external
testimony stand for the fact that it is not contrary to probability
that the soul should again inhabit a body; after that however, it is
incumbent upon us to make a survey of the inconsistencies of their
position, and it will be easy thus, by means of the consequences that
arise as we follow out the consistent view, to bring the truth to
light. What, then, is to be said about these theories? This that those
who would have it that the soul migrates into natures divergent from
each other seem to me to obliterate all natural distinctions; to blend
and confuse together, in every possible respect, the rational, the
irrational, the sentient, and the insensate; if, that is, all these are
to pass into each other, with no distinct natural order εἰρμῷ,
i.e. as links in a chain which cannot be altered. Sifanus’
“carcere et claustro” is due to εἱργμῷ against all the mss. Krabinger’s
six have διατειχιζόμενα
for διαστοιχιζόμενα
of the Editt. secluding them from mutual transition. To
say that one and the same soul, on account of a particular environment
of body, is at one time a rational and intellectual soul, and that then
it is caverned along with the reptiles, or herds with the birds, or is
a beast of burden, or a carnivorous one, or swims in the deep; or even
drops down to an insensate thing, so as to strike out roots or become a
complete tree, producing buds on branches, and from those buds a
flower, or a thorn, or a fruit edible or noxious—to say this, is
nothing short of making all things the same and believing that one
single nature runs through all beings; that there is a connexion
between them which blends and confuses hopelessly all the marks by
which one could be distinguished from another. The philosopher who
asserts that the same thing may be born in anything intends no less
than that all things are to be one; when the observed differences in
things are for him no obstacle to mixing together things which are
utterly incongruous. He makes it necessary that, even when one sees one
of the creatures that are venom-darting or carnivorous, one should
regard it, in spite of appearances, as of the same tribe, nay even of
the same family, as oneself. With such beliefs a man will look even
upon hemlock as not alien to his own nature, detecting, as he does,
humanity in the plant. The grape-bunch itself οὐδε…τὸν
βότρυν. The
intensitive need not surprise us, though a grape-bunch does seem a more
fitting body for a human soul than a stalk of hemlock: it is explained
by the sentence in apposition, “produced…for the purpose of
sustaining life,” i.e. it is eaten, and so a soul might be
eaten; which increases the horror.,
produced though it be by cultivation for the purpose of sustaining
life, he will not regard without suspicion; for it too comes from a
plant καὶ γὰρ καὶ
αὐτὸς τῶν
φυομένων
ἐστίν, i.e.
the fruit, and not the tree only, belongs to the kingdom of
plants: φυτὰ in the next
sentence is exactly equivalent to τὰ
φυόμενα,
i.e. plants. The probability that this is the meaning is
strengthened by Krabinger’s reading οὗτος, from five
of his Codd. But still if αὐτὸς be
retained, it might have been taken to refer to the man who must
needs look suspiciously at a bunch of grapes; “for what,
according to this theory, is he himself, but a vegetable!” since
all things are mixed, πάντα
ὁμοῦ.: and we find even the fruit of the ears of
corn upon which we live are plants; how, then, can one put in the
sickle to cut them down; and how can one squeeze the bunch, or pull up
the thistle from the field, or gather flowers, or hunt birds, or set
fire to the logs of the funeral pyre: it being all the while
uncertain whether
we are not laying violent hands on kinsmen, or ancestors, or
fellow-country-men, and whether it is not through the medium of some
body of theirs that the fire is being kindled, and the cup mixed, and
the food prepared? To think that in the case of any single one of these
things a soul of a man has become a plant or animal Two
Codd. Mon. (D, E) omit φυτὸν ἢ
ζῶον, which is repeated
below., while no marks are stamped upon them to
indicate what sort of plant or animal it is that has been a man, and
what sort has sprung from other beginnings,—such a conception as
this will dispose him who has entertained it to feel an equal amount of
interest in everything: he must perforce either harden himself against
actual human beings who are in the land of the living, or, if his
nature inclines him to love his kindred, he will feel alike towards
every kind of life, whether he meet it in reptiles or in wild beasts.
Why, if the holder of such an opinion go into a thicket of trees, even
then he will regard the trees as a crowd of men. What sort of life will
his be, when he has to be tender towards everything on the ground of
kinship, or else hardened towards mankind on account of his seeing no
difference between them and the other creatures? From what has been
already said, then, we must reject this theory: and there are many
other considerations as well which on the grounds of mere consistency
lead us away from it. For I have heard persons who hold these
opinions i.e.Pythagoreans and later Platonists.
Cf. Origen, c. Cels. iii. 80. For the losing of the wings, cf.
c. Cels iii. 40: “The coats of skins also, which God made
for those sinners, the man and the woman cast forth from the garden,
have a mystical meaning far deeper than Plato’s fancy about the
soul shedding its wings, and moving downward till it meets some spot
upon the solid earth.” saying that whole nations of souls are
hidden away somewhere in a realm of their own, living a life analogous
to that of the embodied soul; but such is the fineness and buoyancy of
their substance that they themselves’ roll round along with the
revolution of the universe; and that these souls, having individually
lost their wings through some gravitation towards evil, become
embodied; first this takes place in men; and after that, passing from a
human life, owing to brutish affinities of their passions, they are
reduced ἀποκτηνοῦσθαι to the level of brutes; and, leaving
that, drop down to this insensate life of pure nature τῆς φυσικῆς
ταύτης. This is
the common reading: but φύσις and
φυσικὸς have a rather higher meaning than our equivalent for them: cf.
just below, “that inherently (τῇ φύσει) fine and buoyant thing”: and Krabinger is probably right
in reading φυτικῆς from four Codd. which you have been hearing so much of; so
that that inherently fine and buoyant thing that the soul is first
becomes weighted and downward tending in consequence of some vice, and
so migrates to a human body; then its reasoning powers are
extinguished, and it goes on living in some brute; and then even this
gift of sensation is withdrawn, and it changes into the insensate plant
life; but after that mounts up again by the same gradations until it is
restored to its place in heaven. Now this doctrine will at once be
found, even after a very cursory survey, to have no coherency with
itself. For, first, seeing that the soul is to be dragged down from its
life in heaven, on account of evil there, to the condition of a tree,
and is then from this point, on account of virtue exhibited there, to
return to heaven, their theory will be unable to decide which is to
have the preference, the life in heaven, or the life in the tree. A
circle, in fact, of the same sequences will be perpetually traversed,
where the soul, at whatever point it may be, has no resting-place. If
it thus lapses from the disembodied state to the embodied, and thence
to the insensate, and then springs back to the disembodied, an
inextricable confusion of good and evil must result in the minds of
those who thus teach. For the life in heaven will no more preserve its
blessedness (since evil can touch heaven’s denizens), than the
life in trees will be devoid of virtue (since it is from this, they
say, that the rebound of the soul towards the good begins, while from
there it begins the evil life again). Secondly With
the γὰρ here (unlike the three preceding) begins the second
“incoherency” of this view. The first
is,—“It confuses the ideas of good and evil.” The
second,—“it is inconsistent with a view already
adopted by these teachers.” The third (beginning
with καὶ
οὐ μέχρι
τούτων, κ.τ.λ.),—it contradicts the truth which it assumes,
i.e. that there is no change in heaven.”,
seeing that the soul as it moves round in heaven is there entangled
with evil and is in consequence dragged down to live in mere matter,
from whence, however, it is lifted again into its residence on high, it
follows that those philosophers establish the very contrary See
just above: “For I have heard persons who hold these opinions
saying that whole nations of souls are hidden away somewhere in a realm
of their own,” &c., and see next note. of their own views; they establish, namely,
that the life in matter is the purgation of evil, while that
undeviating revolution along with the stars that undeviating revolution along with the stars, τὴν
ἀπλανῆ
περιφοράν. Cf. Origen, De Princip. ii. 3–6
(Rufinus’ translation), “Sed et ipsum supereminentem, quem
dicunt ἀπλανῆ,
globum proprie nihilominus mundum appellari volunt:” Cicero,
De Repub. vi. 17: “Novem tibi orbibus ver potius globis
connexa sunt omnia: quorum unus est cœlestis, extimus, qui
reliquos omnes complectitur; in quo infixi sunt illi, qui volvuntur,
stellarum cursus sempiterni,” i.e. they roll, not on their
axes, but only as turning round with the general revolution. They are
literally fixed in that heaven (cf. Virg.: “tacito
volvuntur sidera lapsu”): and the spiritual beings in it are as
fixed and changeless: in fact, with Plato it is the abode only of
Divine intelligences, not of the δαίμονες: but the theorists, whom Gregory is refuting, confuse this
distinction which their own master drew. is
the foundation and cause of evil in every soul: if it is here that the
soul by means of virtue grows its wing and then soars upwards, and
there that those wings by reason of evil fall off, so that it descends
and clings to this lower world and is commingled with the grossness of
material nature. But the untenableness of this view does not stop even
in this, namely, that it contains assertions diametrically opposed to each
other. Beyond this, their fundamental conception ὑπόνοια. itself cannot stand secure on every side.
They say, for instance, that a heavenly nature is unchangeable. How
then, can there be room for any weakness in the unchangeable? If,
again, a lower nature is subject to infirmity, how in the midst of this
infirmity can freedom from it be achieved? They attempt to amalgamate
two things that can never be joined together: they descry strength in
weakness, passionlessness in passion. But even to this last view they
are not faithful throughout; for they bring home the soul from its
material life to that very place whence they had exiled it because of
evil there, as though the life in that place was quite safe and
uncontaminated; apparently quite forgetting the fact that the soul was
weighted with evil there, before it plunged down into this lower
world. The blame thrown on the life here below, and the praise of the
things in heaven, are thus interchanged and reversed; for that which
was once blamed conducts in their opinion to the brighter life, while
that which was taken for the better state gives an impulse to the
soul’s propensity to evil. Expel, therefore, from amongst the
doctrines of the Faith all erroneous and shifting suppositions about
such matters! We must not follow, either, as though they had bit the
truth those who suppose that souls pass from women’s bodies to
live in men Such
theories are developed in the Phædo of Plato; and
constitute ὁ ἕτερος
τῶν λόγων, criticized more fully below., or, reversely Reading δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ
ἔμπαλιν,
instead of the corrupt δοκείη τὸ
ἔμπαλιν.,
that souls that have parted with men’s bodies exist in women: or
even if they only say that they pass from men into men, or from women
into women. As for the former theory ὁ πρότερος (λόγος). The
second is mentioned below. “The same absurdity exists in the
other of the two theories as well.” Obviously these two theories
are those alluded to at the beginning of this last speech of Macrina,
where, speaking of the heathen transmigration, she says, “While
some of them extend this absurdity even to trees and shrubs, so that
they consider their wooden life as corresponding and akin to humanity
(i.e. ὁ προτέρος
λόγος), others of
them opine only thus much, that the soul exchanges one man for another
man,” &c. (i.e. ὁ ἕτερος). In
either case the soul is supposed to return from the dead body to
heaven, and then by a fresh fall into sin there, to sink down again.
The absurdity and the godlessness is just as glaring, Macrina says, in
the last case (the Platonic soul-rotation) as in the first
(Transmigration pure and simple). But the one point in both in contact
with the Christian Resurrection is this, that the soul of the departed
does assume another body., not only has
it been rejected for being shifting and illusory, and for landing us in
opinions diametrically opposed to each other; but it must be rejected
also because it is a godless theory, maintaining as it does that
nothing amongst the things in nature is brought into existence without
deriving its peculiar constitution from evil as its source. If, that
is, neither men nor plants nor cattle can be born unless some soul from
above has fallen into them, and if this fall is owing to some tendency
to evil, then they evidently think that evil controls the creation of
all beings. In some mysterious way, too, both events are to occur at
once; the birth of the man in consequence of a marriage, and the fall
of the soul (synchronizing as it must with the proceedings at that
marriage). A greater absurdity even than this is involved: if, as is
the fact, the large majority of the brute creation copulate in the
spring, are we, then, to say that the spring brings it about that evil
is engendered in the revolving world above, so that, at one and the
same moment, there certain souls are impregnated with evil and
so fall, and here certain brutes conceive? And what are we to
say about the husbandman who sets the vine-shoots in the soil? How does
his hand manage to have covered in a human soul along with the plant,
and how does the moulting of wings last simultaneously with his
employment in planting? The same absurdity, it is to be observed,
exists in the other of the two theories as well; in the direction, I
mean, of thinking that the soul must be anxious about the intercourses
of those living in wedlock, and must be on the look-out for the times
of bringing forth, in order that it may insinuate itself into the
bodies then produced. Supposing the man refuses the union, or the woman
keeps herself clear of the necessity of becoming a mother, will evil
then fail to weigh down that particular soul? Will it be marriage, in
consequence, that sounds up above the first note of evil in the soul,
or will this reversed state invade the soul quite independently of any
marriage? But then, in this last case, the soul will have to wander
about in the interval like a houseless vagabond, lapsed as it has from
its heavenly surroundings, and yet, as it may happen in some cases,
still without a body to receive it. But how, after that, can they
imagine that the Deity exercises any superintendence over the world,
referring as they do the beginnings of human lives to this casual and
meaningless descent of a soul. For all that follows must necessarily
accord with the beginning; and so, if a life begins in consequence of a
chance accident, the whole course of it ἡ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν
(i.e. βίον) διέξοδος. The Editions have κατ᾽
αὐτῶν. Krabinger
well translates by “percursatio.” Cf. Phædrus,
p. 247 A.
becomes at once a chapter of accidents, and the attempt to make the
whole world depend on a Divine power is absurd, when it is made by
these men, who deny to the individualities in it a birth from the fiat
of the Divine Will and refer the several origins of beings to
encounters that come of evil, as though there could never have existed
such a thing as a human life, unless a vice had struck, as it were, its
leading note. If the beginning is like that, a sequel will most
certainly be set in motion in accordance with that beginning. None
would dare to maintain that what is fair can come out of what is foul,
any more than from good can come its opposite. We expect fruit in
accordance with the nature of the seed. Therefore this blind movement
of chance is to rule the whole of life, and no Providence is any more
to pervade the world.