But why does Abraham not say, "Thou hadst" (ἔλαβες) "thy good things," but "thou receivedst" (ἀπέλαβες)? You remember, I dare say, that I said that here a vast and boundless sea of thought is opened before us. For the word (ἀπέλαβες) receivedst suggests and intimates the idea of debt; for any one receives (ἀπολάμβανει) that which is owing to him. If then this rich man was wicked, yea, most wicked, cruel, or inhuman, why is it not said to him," Thou hadst" (ἔλαβες) "thy good things," but "thou receivedst" (ἀπέλαβες), as if it implied things deserved by, or owed to him? What then do we learn from this? That some men, even wicked men, even those who have proceeded to the very extremity of wickedness, may often have done one, or two, or three good things. And that this statement is not mere conjecture is plain, from the following case. For what greater wickedness could exist than that of the unjust judge? What could be more inhuman, what more impious? This man neither feared God nor regarded men, (Luke xviii. 2.) Still, though living in such wickedness, he performed one good act, namely, the having pity on the widow who constantly troubled him; the yielding to grace, and granting her request, and proceeding against those who troubled her. Thus also it happens that a man may be intemperate, and at the same time often merciful; or he may be cruel, but also sober; and if he be both intemperate and cruel, still, often in the business of life, he may do some good deed. And similarly we ought to think of the good. For as the most depraved of men often do some useful thing, so also the zealous and honourable often commit sin in some respect. "For who," it is said, "can boast that he has a clean heart, or who can say that he is free from iniquity?" (Prov. xx. 9.)