the body, when some invisible cause distresses it, while the body is safe and sound. Even
when not associated with the body it is pained; for certainly that rich man was suffering in
hell when he cried, “I am tormented in this flame.”1496 But as for the body, it suffers no
pain when it is soulless; and even when animate it can suffer only by the soul’s suffering.
If, therefore, we might draw a just presumption from the existence of pain to that of death,
and conclude that where pain can be felt death can occur, death would rather be the property
of the soul, for to it pain more peculiarly belongs. But, seeing that that which suffers most
cannot die, what ground is there for supposing that those bodies, because destined to suffer,
are therefore, destined to die? The Platonists indeed maintained that these earthly bodies
and dying members gave rise to the fears, desires, griefs, and joys of the soul. “Hence,” says
Virgil (i.e., from these earthly bodies and dying members),
“Hence wild desires and grovelling fears,
And human laughter, human tears.”1497
But in the fourteenth book of this work1498 we have proved that, according to the Pla-
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tonists’ own theory, souls, even when purged from all pollution of the body, are yet pos
sessed by a monstrous desire to return again into their bodies. But where desire can exist,
certainly pain also can exist; for desire frustrated, either by missing what it aims at or losing
what it had attained, is turned into pain. And therefore, if the soul, which is either the only
or the chief sufferer, has yet a kind of immortality of its own, it is inconsequent to say that
because the bodies of the damned shall suffer pain, therefore they shall die. In fine, if the
body causes the soul to suffer, why can the body not cause death as well as suffering, unless
because it does not follow that what causes pain causes death as well? And why then is it
incredible that these fires can cause pain but not death to those bodies we speak of, just as
the bodies themselves cause pain, but not therefore death, to the souls? Pain is therefore
no necessary presumption of death.
1496 Luke xvi. 24.
1497 Æneid, vi. 733.
1498 Ch. 3, 5, 6.
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Whether Bodily Suffering Necessarily Terminates in the Destruction of the…