X.  But they say, The Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same; and if this is so, neither is the Son the same as the Father.  It is clear, without saying so, that this line of argument manifestly excludes either the Son or the Father from the Godhead.  For if to be Unbegotten is the Essence of God, to be begotten is not that Essence; if the opposite is the case, the Unbegotten is excluded.  What argument can contradict this?  Choose then whichever blasphemy you prefer, my good inventor of a new theology, if indeed you are anxious at all costs to embrace a blasphemy.  In the next place, in what sense do you assert that the Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same?  If you mean that the Uncreated and the created are not the same, I agree with you; for certainly the Unoriginate and the created are not of the same nature.  But if you say that He That begat and That which is begotten are not the same, the statement is inaccurate.  For it is in fact a necessary truth that they are the same.  For the nature of the relation of Father to Child is this, that the offspring is of the same nature with the parent.  Or we may argue thus again.  What do you mean by Unbegotten and Begotten, for if you mean the simple fact of being unbegotten or begotten, these are not the same; but if you mean Those to Whom these terms apply, how are They not the same?  For example, Wisdom and Unwisdom are not the same in themselves, but yet both are attributes of man, who is the same; and they mark not a difference of essence, but one external to the essence. cf. Petavius De Trin., V. ii., 2.  Are immortality and innocence and immutability also the essence of God?  If so God has many essences and not one; or Deity is a compound of these.  For He cannot be all these without composition, if they be essences.