ness. For we have no way to prove any thing else, but by arguing from effects to Causes:
from the ideas now immediately in view, we argue other things not immediately in view;
from sensations now excited in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the Causes
of these sensations; and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, on which
they depend, as effects on Causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves, or any thing else,
by memory; only as we argue, that the ideas, which are now in our minds, are the con-
sequences of past ideas and sensations. We immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas
which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other things only by
means of these, as necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things
may be without Causes, all this necessary connexion and dependence is dissolved, and so
all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity or difficulty in supposing one
thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a Cause; then there is no ab-
surdity or difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions. For nothing, or no diffi-
culty, multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficulty: nothing multiplied by nothing, does not
increase the sum.
And indeed, according to the hypothesis I am opposing, of the acts of the Will coming
to pass without a Cause, it is the cause in fact, that millions of millions of Events are continu-
ally coming into existence contingently, without any Cause or reason why they do so, all
over the world, every day and hour, through all ages. So it is in a constant succession, in
every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient nothing, this effectual No-Cause, is always
ready at hand, to produce this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as he
has occasion.
If it were so, that things only of one kind, viz. acts of the Will, seemed to come to pass
of themselves; and it were an Event that was continual, and that happened in a course,
wherever were found subjects capable of such Events; this very thing would demonstrate
that there was some Cause of them, which made such a difference between this Event and
others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For contingence is blind, and does
not pick and choose a particular sort of Events. Nothing has no choice. This No-Cause,
which causes no existence, cannot cause the existence which comes to pass, to be of one
particular sort only, distinguished from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops
out of the heavens, even water, and that this comes so often, so constantly and plentifully,
all over the world, in all ages, shows that there is some Cause or reason of the falling of water
out of the heavens; and that something besides mere contingence has a hand in the matter.
If we should suppose Non-entity to be about to bring forth; and things were coming
into existence, without any Cause or antecedent, on which the existence, or kind, or manner
of existence depends; or which could at all determine whether the things should be stones,
or stars, or beasts, or angels, or human bodies, or souls, or only some new motion or figure
in natural bodies, or some new sensations in animals, or new ideas in the human understand-
553
SECTION III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular,…