57. While, then, this is the case, and it cannot but be that only one of all these opinions
is true, they all nevertheless make use of arguments in striving with each other,—and not
one of them is without something plausible to say, whether in affirming his own views, or
objecting to the opinions of others. In exactly the same way is the condition of souls discussed.
For this one thinks that they both are immortal, and survive the end of our earthly life; that
one believes that they do not survive, but perish with the bodies themselves: the opinion of
another, however, is that they suffer nothing immediately, but that, after the form of man
has been laid aside, they are allowed to live a little longer,3801 and then come under the
power of death. And while all these opinions cannot be alike true, yet all who hold them so
support their case by strong and very weighty arguments, that you cannot find out anything
which seems false to you, although on every side you see that things are being said altogether
at variance with each other, and inconsistent from their opposition to each other;3802 which
assuredly would not happen, if man s curiosity could reach any certainty, or if that which
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seemed to one to have been really discovered, was attested by the approval of all the others.
It is therefore wholly3803 vain, a useless task, to bring forward something as though you
knew it, or to wish to assert that you know that which, although it should be true, you see
can be refuted; or to receive that as true which it may be is not, and is brought forward as
if by men raving. And it is rightly so, for we do not weigh and guess at3804 divine things by
divine, but by human methods; and just as we think that anything should have been made,
so we assert that it must be.
3801 Lit., “something is given to them to life.” So the Stoics taught, although Chrysippus (cf. n. 9, ch. 31, p.
446) held that only the souls of the wise remained at all after death.
3802 The ms., first four edd., and Oehler read et rerum contrarietatibus dissonare—“and that they disagree
from the oppositions of things.” Hild. reads dissonora, a word not met with elsewhere, while the other edd.
merely drop the last two letters, -re, as above; a reading suggested in the margin of Ursinus.
3803 Lit., “a most vain thing,” etc.
3804 So the ms., LB., Elmenh., Hild., and Oehler, reading conjectamus, the other edd. reading commetamur
or -imur—“measure,” except Gelenius and Canterus, who read commentamur—“muse upon.”
Chapter LVII.
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Chapter LVII.