But that we might gain some sort
of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him,
we have stamped our different ideas with certain words and syllables,
labelling, as it were, our mental processes with verbal formulæ to
serve as characteristic notes and indications, with the object of
giving a clear and simple declaration of our mental processes by means
of words attached to, and expressive of, our ideas. Why, then, does he
find fault with our contention that the term ungeneracy was devised to
indicate the existence of God without origin or beginning, and that,
independently of all exercise of speech, or silence, or thought, and
before the very idea of creation, God was and remains ungenerate? If,
indeed, any one should argue that God was not ungenerate till the name
ungeneracy had been found, the man might be pardonable for writing as
he has written, in contravention of such an absurdity. But if no one
denies that He existed before speech and reason, whereas, while the
form of words by which the meaning is expressed is said by us to have
been devised by mental conception, the end and aim of his controversy
with us is to show that the name is not of man’s device, but that
it existed before our creation, though by whom it was spoken I do not
know Oehler’s reading and stopping are both faulty here,
viz., οὐκ
οἶδα περὶ
τίνος
λεγόμενον τί
κοινὸν ἔχει
κ.τ.λ. Manifestly the stop
should be at λεγόμενον, and the reading of the editt. παρὰ
τίνος is
right., what has the assertion that God existed
ungenerately before all things, and the contention that It is
not necessary to change the τὸ here to τῷ as Oehler
suggests. The Munich Cod. omits it altogether. But he has done good
service to the text, by supplying from his Codices all that follows,
down to “the same sort of argument” (except that the
first διαγωνίζεσθαι
is probably a gloss). mental conception is posterior to God, got
to do with this aim of his? For that God is not a conception has been
fully demonstrated, so that we may press him with the same sort of
argument, and reply, so to say, in his own words, e.g. “It
is utter folly to regard understanding as of earlier birth than those
who exercise it”; or again, as he proceeds a little below,
“Nor as though we intended this, i.e. to make men, the
latest of God’s works of creation, anterior to the conceptions of
their own understanding.” Great indeed would be the force of the
argument, if any one of us, out of sheer folly and madness, should
argue that God was a conception of the mind. But if this is not so, nor
ever has been, (for who would go to such a pitch of folly as to assert
that He Who alone is, and Who brought all else whatsoever into being,
has no substantial existence of His own, and to make Him out to be a
mere conception of a name?) why does he fight with shadows, contending
with imaginary propositions? Is not the cause of this unreasonable
litigiousness clear, that, feeling ashamed of the fallacy respecting
ungeneracy with which his dupes have been deluded (since it has been
proved that the word is very far removed from the Divine essence), he
is deliberately shuffling up his arguments, shifting the controversy
from words to things, so that by throwing all into confusion the unwary
may more easily be seduced, by imagining that God has been described by
us either as a conception, or as posterior in existence to the
invention of human terminology; and thus, leaving our argument
unrefuted, he is shifting his position to another quarter of the field?
For our conclusion was, as I have said, that the term ungeneracy does
not indicate the Divine nature, but is applicable to it as the result
of a conception by which the fact that God subsists without prior cause
is pointed at. But what they were for establishing was this: that the
word was indicative of the Divine essence itself. Yet how has it been
established that the word has this force? I suppose the handling of
this question is in reserve in some other of his writings. But here he
makes it his main object to show that God exists ungenerately, just as
though some one were simply questioning him on such points as
these—what view he held as to the term ungenerate, whether he
thought it invented to show that the First Cause was without beginning
and origin, or as declaring the Divine essence itself; and he, with
much assumption of gravity and wisdom, were replying that he, for his
part, had no doubt that God was the Maker of heaven and earth. How
widely this method of proceeding differs from, and is unconnected with,
his first contention, you may see, in the same way as you may see how
little his fine description of his controversy with us is connected
with the question at issue. For let us look at the matter in this
wise.