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And if the word Action is arbitrarily used by some men otherwise, to suit some scheme of metaphysics or morality, no argument can reasonably be founded on such a use of this term, to prove any thing but their own pleasure. For divines and philosophers strenuously to urge such arguments, as though they were sufficient to support and demonstrate a whole scheme of moral philosophy and divinity, is certainly to erect a mighty edifice on the sand, or rather on a shadow. And though it may now perhaps, through custom, have become natural for then to use the word in this sense, (if that may be called a sense or meaning, which is inconsistent with itself,) yet this does not prove, that it is agreeable to the natural notions men have of things, or that there can be any thing in the creation that should answer such a meaning. And though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men are so far from experiencing any such thing, that it is impossible for them to have any conception of it. If it should be objected, that Action and Passion are doubtless words of a contrary signi- fication; but to suppose that the agent, in its Action, is under the power and influence of something intrinsic, is to confound Action and passion, and make them the same thing: I answer, that Action and Passion are doubtless, as they are sometimes used, words of opposite signification; but not as signifying opposite existences, but only opposite relations. The words cause and effect are terms of opposite signification; but, nevertheless, if I assert, that the same thing may, at the same time, in different respects and relations, be both cause and effect, this will not prove that I confound the terms. The soul may be both active and passive in the same thing in different respects; active with relation to one thing, and passive with relation to another. 139 The word Passion, when set in opposition to Action, or rather activeness, is merely a relative: it signifies no effect or cause, nor any proper existence; but is the same with Passiveness, or a being passive, or a being acted upon by something. Which is a mere relation of a thing to some power or force exerted by some cause, producing some effect in it, or upon it. And Action, when set properly in opposition to Passion, or Passiveness, is no real existence; it is not the same with an Action, but is a mere relation: it is the activeness of something on another thing, being the opposite relation to the other, viz. a relation of power, or force, exerted by some cause, towards another thing, which is the subject of the effect of that power. Indeed, the word Action is frequently used to signify something not 139 This distinction is of considerable moment. The soul is passive, for instance, in reference to that necessity of dependence which is inseparable from a created nature; and when the subject of providential energy in nat- ural acts; and also when the subject of that divine influence which purifies and enables the mind, and whereby holy effects are secured; and in all these respects it is passive at the very time that it is active in its choice or preference. In other words, the mind is necessitated in some respects; as, to exist, to think, to will, to suffer, or to enjoy; at the same instant that it is free in other respects, as, from contingence, (understanding thereby an event without any cause,) and from compulsions, or physical necessity in its acts as moral.—W. 687 SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion…

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