SECT. I.
Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty of Will, consisting
in the Will’s self-determining Power.
Having taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be observed, concerning
the meaning of the principal terms and phrases made use of in controversies concerning
human liberty, and particularly observed what Liberty is according to the common language
and general apprehension of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by
Arminians; I proceed to consider the Arminian notion of the Freedom of the Will, and the
supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any one’s being capable of
virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or counsel, praise or blame, promises
or threatenings, rewards or punishments; or whether that which has been described, as the
thing meant by Liberty in common speech, be not sufficient, and the only Liberty, which
makes or can make any one a moral agent, and so properly the subject of these things. In
this Part, I shall consider whether any such thing be possible or conceivable, as that Freedom
of Will which Arminians insist on; and shall inquire, whether any such sort of Liberty be
necessary to moral agency, &c. in the next part.
And first of all, I shall consider the notion of a self-determining Power in the Will:
wherein, according to the Arminians, does most essentially consist the Will’s freedom; and
shall particularly inquire, whether it be not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconsistence, to
suppose that the Will itself determines all the free acts of the Will.
Here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such ways of speaking as the Will de-
termining itself; because actions are to be ascribed to agents, and not properly to the powers
of agents; which improper way of speaking leads to many mistakes, and much confusion,
as Mr. Locke observes. But I shall suppose that the Arminians, when they speak of the Will’s
determining itself, do by the Will mean the soul willing. I shall take it for granted, that when
they speak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean the soul in the exercise of a power of
willing, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be their meaning, because nothing else
can be meant, without the grossest and plainest absurdity. In all cases when we speak of the
powers or principles of acting, or doing such things, we mean that the agents which have
these Powers of acting, do them, in the exercise of those Powers. So where we say, valor
fights courageously, we mean, the man who is under the influence of valor fights cour-
ageously. When we say, love seeks the object loved, we mean, the person loving seeks that
object. When we say, the understanding discerns, we mean the soul in the exercise of that
faculty. So when it is said, the will decides or determines, this meaning must be, that the
person, in the exercise of: Power of willing and choosing, or the soul, acting voluntarily,
determines.
Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts, the soul determines them in the
exercise of a Power of willing and choosing; or, which is the same thing, it determines them
SECTION I. Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power.
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SECTION I. Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of…