29. If ye know (appeal to their recognition of the divine character as that which he describes it) that He is righteous (of whom is this said? If of Christ, as seems most natural after αὐτοῦ.… αὐτοῦ preceding, we find a difficulty in ἐξαὐτοῦγεγέννηται below, seeing that we are never said to be born anew of Christ, but always of God (through Christ), ch. 1 John 3:1; 1 John 3:9; 1 John 4:7; 1 John 5:1; 1 John 5:4; 1 John 5:18 &c. If on the other hand they are said of God, it seems strange that after a change of reference from the preceding αὐτοῦ, another subject should be expressed in ch. 1 John 3:1 by the words ὁπατήρ. In consequence of these difficulties, some, as Storr, Lücke, al., have referred δίκαιόςἐστιν to Christ, and ἐξαὐτοῦ to God; which cannot well be. It would be possible, doubtless, to understand the whole of Christ, without change of subject from 1 John 2:28; and to leave the γεγέννηταιἐξαὐτοῦ as we find it.
If it occurs no where else in reference to Christ, there is in it nothing abhorrent from our Christian ideas. And in St. John’s sense of the intimate union between the Father and Son, he who is born of the Father might be said to be born of the Son also. Another reason for this might be the easily occurring reference, in δίκαιόςἐστιν, to Ἰησοῦνχριστὸνδίκαιον, 1 John 2:1. This view is taken by Bengel, Corn.-a-lap., Lorinus, al. But after all, the other, which is that of most ancient expositors, of Baumg.-Crus., De Wette, Neander, Düsterdieck, al., must, I apprehend, be adopted.
The analogy of the passage, as shewn in ch. 1 John 3:1-2; 1 John 3:9-10, fixes the ἐξαὐτοῦγεγέννηται to birth from God: and the absence of a new expressed subject in δίκαιόςἐστιν must be accounted for by remembering that this verse, as ch. 1 John 1:5, is the opening, and general statement, of a new section of the Epistle. And the essential unity of the Father and the Son comes in on this side also: so that the judgment alluded to 1 John 2:28, which shall be executed by the Son, being judgment committed to Him by the Father, brings to mind the justice and righteousness in which that judgment is founded.
The whole subject of the righteousness of God is fully treated by Düsterd. in his note here. The definition which seems to him to express it most fully, is that of Hollaz, one of the best of the old Lutheran dogmatists (died 1713),—in his Examen theologicum,—“Justitia Dei est attributum divinum ἐνεργητικόν, vi cujus Deus omnia qnæ æternæsuælegi sunt conformia, vult et agit; creaturis convenientes leges præscribit, promissa facta hominibus implet, bonos remuneratur et impios punit”): ye know (many, as vulg., which Aug[36], Bed[37], and the R.-C. expositors follow, also Luth., Calv., Socin., Episcop., Grot., Carpzov., Lücke, Sander, al., take ã é í þ ó ê å ô å as imperative. But the whole tone of the Epistle is against this: which is one not of authoritative revelation of truth, but of inferring ethical truth from previously known theosophic facts. And with such a tone it is much more consonant to say, “If ye know the one, ye know—that knowledge sets forth and assumes—the other:”than to say, “If ye know the one, know the other.”Not to insist, that ã é í þ ó ê å é í is more the apprehension, εἴδητε the possession, of knowledge; if ye are already aware, …ye thereby know …) that also every one who doeth righteousness ( τὴνδικαιοσύνην, the righteousness which is implied in ä ß ê á é ï ò above: if it were not too strong, we might almost say, “that righteousness:”the art. shewing that there is no other. πᾶς, “omnis, et solus,”says Bengel: every one, and no one else. The proposition will bear converting: not logically, but theologically, ποιῶν, for (see Hollaz’s definition above) all righteousness is energetic: it springs out of holiness, truth, love: πρακτικαὶγὰραἱἀρεταί, καὶἐντῷγίνεσθαιἔχουσιτὸεἶναιπαυσάμεναιγὰρἢμέλλουσαιοὐδὲτὸεἶναιἔχουσι. Œc. on ch. 1 John 3:3), is born (= hath been begotten) of Him (God: see above: ὁδίκαιοςγὰρδικαίουςγεννᾷ.
[36] Augustine, Bp. of Hippo, 395–430
[37] Bede, the Venerable, 731; Bedegr, a Greek MS. cited by Bede, nearly identical with Cod. “E,”mentioned in this edn only when it differs from E.
The inference here must be carefully kept to the Apostle’s words and obvious sense. And those require that we should understand it thus: God is righteous. This is our axiom, from which we set out. And if so, then the source of righteousness. When therefore a man doeth righteousness, ã é í þ ó ê ï ì å í, we apprehend, we collect, from our previous knowledge of these truths, that the source of his righteousness is God: that in consequence he has acquired by new birth from God, that righteousness which he had not by nature. We argue from his ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην to his γεγεννῆσθαιἐκθεοῦ.
And the right apprehension of this is the more important, because the whole mass of Socinian and Pelagian Commentators have reversed the members of the argument, and made it conclude that ποιεῖντὴνδικαιοσύνην is the condition, on our part, of becoming a child of God. So Socinus, Episcopius, Grot., Hammond, Semler, Rosenmüller, al. And the R.-C. expositors, while they avoid this error, making the good works spoken of to be, as Lyra, “opera justitiæinfusæ, quædatur cum gratia, per quam homo constituitur in quadam participatione supernaturali esse divini,”yet go equally wrong, in understanding ã å ã Ý í í ç ô á é not as the statement of a past and abiding fact, but as the ground of a confidence as to the future: “habebit omnimodam fiduciam, quia judici suo justo similis, imo ex ipso natus est, hoc est, ipsius filius et hæres est.”Corn.-a-lap.).