Chapter III.—The Question of Novelty Further Considered in Connection with the
Words of the Lord and His Apostles.
But (as for the question) whether monogamy be “burdensome,” let the still shameless
“infirmity of the flesh” look to that: let us meantime come to an agreement as to whether
it be “novel.” This (even) broader assertion we make: that even if the Paraclete had in this
our day definitely prescribed a virginity or continence total and absolute, so as not to permit
the heat of the flesh to foam itself down even in single marriage, even thus He would seem
to be introducing nothing of “novelty;” seeing that the Lord Himself opens “the kingdoms
of the heavens” to “eunuchs,” 585 as being Himself, withal, a virgin; to whom looking, the
apostle also—himself too for this reason abstinent—gives the preference to continence. 586
(“Yes”), you say, “but saving the law of marriage.” Saving it, plainly, and we will see under
what limitations; nevertheless already destroying it, in so far as he gives the preference to
continence. “Good,” he says, “(it is) for a man not to have contact with a woman.” It follows
that it is evil to have contact with her; for nothing is contrary to good except evil. And ac-
cordingly (he says), “It remains, that both they who have wives so be as if they have not,”
587 that it may be the more binding on them who have not to abstain from having them.
He renders reasons, likewise, for so advising: that the unmarried think about God, but the
married about how, in (their) marriage, each may please his (partner). 588 And I may con-
tend, that what is permitted is not absolutely good. 589 For what is absolutely good is not
permitted, but needs no asking to make it lawful. Permission has its cause sometimes even
in necessity. Finally, in this case, there is no volition on the part of him who permits mar-
riage. For his volition points another way. “I will,” he says, “that you all so be as I too (am).”
590 And when he shows that (so to abide) is “better,” what, pray, does he demonstrate
himself to “will,” but what he has premised is “better?” And thus, if he permits something
other than what he has “willed”—permitted not voluntarily, but of necessity—he shows that
what he has unwillingly granted as an indulgence is not absolutely good. Finally, when he
says, “Better it is to marry than to burn,” what sort of good must that be understood to be
which is better than a penalty? which cannot seem “better” except when compared to a thing
very bad? “Good” is that which keeps this name per se; without comparison—I say not with
an evil, but even—with some other good: so that, even if it be compared to and overshadowed
585 See Matt. xix. 12. Comp. de. Pa., c. xiii.; de. Cult. Fem., l. ii. c. ix.
586 See 1 Cor. vii. 1, 7, 37, 40; and comp. de Ex. Cast., c. iv.
587 1 Cor. vii. 29.
588 1 Cor. vii. 32–34.
589 Comp. ad Ux., l. i. c. iii.; de Cult. Fem., l. ii. c. x. sub fin.; and de Ex. Cast., c. iii., which agrees nearly ver-
batim with what follows.
590 1 Cor. vii. 7, only the Greek is θέλω, not βούλομαι.
The Question of Novelty Further Considered in Connection with the Words of the Lord and His Apostles.
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The Question of Novelty Further Considered in Connection with the Words…