sanctioned the expression. But perhaps you accept it by reason of the sense that resides in
it. Well, we ourselves in the same way accept the term “conception” by reason of the sense
that resides in it. Accordingly we will either exclude both from use, or neither, and whichever
alternative be adopted, we are equally masters of the field. For if the term “ungenerate” be
altogether suppressed, all our adversaries’ clamour against the truth is suppressed along
with it, and a doctrine worthy of the Only-begotten Son of God will shine forth, inasmuch
as logical opposition can furnish no name1146 to detract from the majesty of the Lord. But
if both be retained, in that case also the truth will prevail, and we along with it, when we
have altered the word “ungeneracy” from the substance, into a conception, of the Deity. But
so long as he does not exclude the term “ungenerate” from his own writings, let our modern
Pharisee admonish himself not to behold the mote that is in our eye, before he has cast out
the beam that is in his own.
“But God,” he says, “gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable
names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, and to the highest He imparted
the names of the lowest, though the natural inferiority of the latter was not transferred to
the former along with their names.” We quote this in his very words. If they contain some
deep and recondite meaning which has escaped us, let those inform us who see what is
beyond our range of vision—initiated as they are by him in his esoteric and unspeakable
mysteries. But if they admit of no interpretation beyond what is obvious, I scarcely know
which of the two are more to be pitied, those who say such things or those who listen to
them. To the weakest of terrestrial things, he says, God has given names in common with
the most honourable, though not giving them an equal share of dignity. Let us examine
what is meant by this. The weakest things, he says, are dignified with the bare name belonging
to the honourable, their nature not corresponding with their name. And this he states to be
the work of the God of truth—to dignify the worse nature with the worthier appellation!
On the other hand, he says that God applies the less honourable names to things superior
in their nature, the nature of the latter not being carried over to the former along with the
appellation. But that the matter may be made plainer still, the absurdity shall be shown by
actual instances. If any one should call a man who is esteemed for every virtue, intemperate;
or, on the other hand, a man equally in disrepute for his vices, good and moral, would
sensible people think him of sound mind, or one who had any regard for truth, reversing,
as would be the case, the meanings of words, and giving them a non-natural signification?
I for my part think not. He speaks, then, of things relating to God, out of all keeping with
our common ideas and with the holy Scriptures. For in matters of ordinary life it is only
those who are unsettled by drink or madness that go wrong in names, and use them out of
their proper meaning, calling, it may be, a man a dog, or vice versa. But Holy Scripture is
1146 i.e.no other name. See note on ᾽Αγέννητος, p. 100.
532
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.