function, yet does not form itself into so dense a body that he who will may grasp and hold
it in his palms, and offer resistance to its stroke, so if one should say the same of his pompous
piece of writing, the comparison would not be untrue. Much nonsense is worked up in his
tumid and viscous discourse, and to one not gifted with over-much discernment, like a mist
to one viewing it from afar, it seems to have some substance and shape, but if you come up
to it and scrutinize what is said, the theories slip from your hold like smoke, and vanish into
nothing, nor have they any solidity or resistance to oppose to the stroke of your argument.
It is difficult, therefore, to know what to do. For to those who like to complain either altern-
ative will seem objectionable; whether, leaping over his empty wordiness, as over a ravine,
we direct the course of our argument to the level and open country, against those points
which seem to have any strength against the truth, or form our absurd battle along the whole
line of his inanities. For in the latter case, to those who do not love hard work, our labour,
extending over some thousands of lines to no useful purpose, will be wearisome and unprof-
itable. But if we attack those points only which seem to have some force against the truth,
we shall give occasion to our adversaries to accuse us of passing over arguments of theirs
which we are unable to refute. Since, then, two courses are open to us, either to take all their
arguments seriatim, or to run through those only which are more important—the one course
tedious to our hearers, the other liable to be suspected by our assailants—I think it best to
take a middle course, and so, as far as possible, to avoid censure on either hand. What, then,
is our method? After clearing his vain productions, as well as we can, of the rubbish they
have accumulated, we will summarily run through the main points of his argument in such
a way as neither to plunge needlessly into the profundities of his nonsense, nor to leave any
of his statements unexamined. Now his whole treatise is an ambitious attempt to show that
God speaks after the manner of men, and that the Creator of all things gives them suitable
names, indicative of the things themselves. And, therefore, opposing himself to him who
contended that such names are given by that rational nature which we have received from
God, he accuses him of error, and of desertion from his fundamental proposition: and
having brought this charge against him, he uses the following arguments in support of his
position.
Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more
minute and accurate investigation of the thing under consideration is called conception.
And Eunomius disproves this, as he thinks, by the following argument, that where this first,
and this second notion, i.e. one more minute and accurate than the other, are not found,
the operation which we call thought and conception does not find place. Here, however, he
will be convicted of dishonesty by all who have ears to hear. For it was not of all thought
536
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.