its ability or power to will, must be the same thing as the Indifference of the state of the
power or faculty of the Will, or the Indifference of the state which the soul itself, which has
that power or faculty, hitherto remains in, as to the exercise of that power, in the choice it
shall by and by make.
But not to insist any longer on the inexplicable abstruseness of this distinction; let what
will be supposed concerning the meaning of them that use it, this much must at least be
intended by Arminians when they talk of Indifference as essential to Liberty of Will, if they
intend any thing, in any respect to their purpose, viz. That it is such an Indifference as leaves
the Will not determined already; but free from actual possession, and vacant of predetermin-
ation, so far, that there may be room for the exercise of the self-determining power of the
Will; and that the Will’s freedom consists in, or depends upon, this vacancy and opportunity
that is left for the Will itself to be the determiner of the act that is to be the free act.
And here I would observe in the first place, that to make out this scheme of Liberty, the
Indifference must be perfectand absolute; there must be a perfect freedom from all antecedent
preponderation or inclination. Because if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts its
own sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself: if when two
opposites are proposed to the soul for its choice, the proposal does not find the soul wholly
in a state of Indifference, then it is not found in a state of Liberty for mere self-determina-
tion.—The least degree of an antecedent bias must be inconsistent with their notion of
Liberty. For so long as prior inclination possesses the Will, and is not removed, the former
binds the latter, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act otherwise than
agreeably to it. Surely the Will cannot act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing in-
clination of the Will. To suppose otherwise, would be the same thing as to suppose that the
Will is inclined contrary to its present prevailing inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined
to. That which the Will prefers, to that, all things considered, it preponderates and inclines.
It is equally impossible for the Will to choose contrary to its own remaining and present
preponderating inclination, as it is to prefer contrary to its own present preference, or choose
contrary to its own present choice. The Will, therefore, so long as it is under the influence
of an old preponderating inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free act; or any, that shall
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now be an act of self-determination. That which is a self-determined free act, must be one
which the Will determines in the possession and use of a peculiar sort of Liberty; such as
consists in a freedom from every thing, which, if it were there, would make it impossible that
the Will, at that time, should be otherwise than that way to which it tends. 119
119 There is a little intricacy in this mode of expression. It may be thus illustrated. Suppose it were asserted.
“That it is impossible for the Will to be otherwise at any one given time, than that way to which it tends.” Such
a proposition one might think, none who understood the terms would controvert; for it would be to controvert
this proposition, “The Will is as its tendency.” And yet, the advocates for a self-determining power must assert
a liberty which denies this plain proposition.—W.
568
SECTION VII. Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.…