and circumstances of the objects viewed, and the manner of the view. Perhaps, if we strictly
consider the matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to
the agreeableness of objects, any other way, than as it makes the objects themselves appear
differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and, as
it occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity,
pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively.
However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that can be men-
tioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been ex-
plained. The choice of the mind never departs from that which, at the time, and with respect
to the direct and immediate objects of decision, appears most agreeable and pleasing, all
things considered. If the immediate objects of the Will are a man’s own actions, then those
actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all
things considered, to walk, then he now wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what
at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to speak; if it suits him
best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep silence. There is scarcely a plainer and more
universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily,
and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to
them. To say, that they do what pleases them, but yet not what is agreeable to them, is the
same thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to
say, that they do what they please and yet do not what they please.
It appears from these things, that in some sense, the Will always follows the last dictate
of the understanding. But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including
the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called reason or
judgment. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best,
or most for the person’s happiness, taking in the whole of its duration, it is not true, that
the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite
a different matter from things appearing now most agreeable, all things being put together
which pertain to the mind’s present perceptions in any respect: although that dictate of
reason, when it takes place, has concern in the compound influence which moves the Will;
and should be considered in estimating the degree of that appearance of good which the
Will always follows; either as having its influence added to other things, or subducted from
them. When such dictate of reason concurs with other things, then its weight is added to
them, as put into the same scale; but when it is against them, it is as a weight in the opposite
scale, resisting the influence of other things: yet its resistance is often overcome by their
8
greater weight, and so the act of the Will is determined in opposition to it.
These things may serve, I hope, in some measure, illustrate and confirm the position
laid down in the beginning of section, viz. “That the Will is always determined by the
strongest motive,” or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous
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SECTION II. Concerning the Determination of the Will.