After these distinctions on our
part no one can well be longer in doubt how the Only-begotten at once
is believed to be “of the Father,” and is eternally,
even if the one phrase does not at first sight seem to agree with the
other,—that which declares Him to be “of the Father”
with that which asserts His eternity. But if we are to confirm our
statement by further arguments, it may be possible to apprehend the
doctrine on this point by the aid of things cognizable by our senses.
And let no one deride our statement, if it cannot find among existing
things a likeness of the object of our enquiry such as may be in all
respects sufficient for the presentation of the matter in hand by way
of analogy and resemblance. For we should like to persuade those who
say that the Father first willed and so proceeded to become a Father,
and on this ground assert posteriority in existence as regards the
Word, by whatever illustrations may make it possible, to turn to the
orthodox view. Neither does this immediate conjunction exclude the
“willing” of the Father, in the sense that He had a Son
without choice, by some necessity of His Nature, nor does the
“willing” separate the Son from the Father, coming in
between them as a kind of interval: so that we neither reject from our
doctrine the “willing” of the Begetter directed to the Son,
as being, so to say, forced out by the conjunction of the Son’s
oneness with the Father, nor do we by any means break that inseparable
connection, when “willing” is regarded as involved in the
generation. For to our heavy and inert nature it properly belongs that
the wish and the possession of a thing are not often present with us at
the same moment; but now we wish for something we have not, and at
another time we obtain what we do not wish to obtain. But, in the case
of the simple and all-powerful Nature, all things are conceived
together and at once, the willing of good as well as the possession of
what He wills. For the good and the eternal will is contemplated as
operating, indwelling, and co-existing in the eternal Nature, not
arising in it from any separate principle, nor capable of being
conceived apart from the object of will: for it is not possible that
with God either the good will should not be, or the object of will
should not accompany the act of will, since no cause can either bring
it about that that which befits the Father should not always be, or be
any hindrance to the possession of the object of will. Since, then, the
Only-begotten God is by nature the good (or rather beyond all good),
and since the good does not fail to be the object of the Father’s
will, it is hereby clearly shown, both that the conjunction of the Son
with the Father is without any intermediary, and also that the will,
which is always present in the good Nature, is not forced out nor
excluded by reason of this inseparable conjunction. And if any one is
listening to my argument in no scoffing spirit, I should like to add to
what I have already said something of the following kind.