peaceful—and generally all that is reproached with vice, as compared with what is more
excellent, is said to exhibit “variance” from it, because the marks observed in both—in the
good, I mean, and the inferior—do not mutually agree. Again, we say that those qualities
observed in the elements are “at variance” which are mutually opposed as contraries, having
a power reciprocally destructive, as heat and cold, or dryness and moisture, or, generally,
anything that is opposed to another as a contrary; and the absence of union in these we ex-
press by the term “variation”; and generally everything which is out of harmony with another
in their observed characteristics, is said to be “at variance” with it, as health with disease,
life with death, war with peace, virtue with vice, and all similar cases.
Now that we have thus analyzed these expressions, let us also consider in regard to our
author in what sense he says that the essences of the Father and the Son are “variant from
each other.” What does he mean by it? Is it in the sense that the Father is according to nature,
while the Son “varies” from that nature? Or does he express by this word the perversion of
virtue, separating the evil from the more excellent by the name of “variation,” so as to regard
the one essence in a good, the other in a contrary aspect? Or does he assert that one Divine
essence also is variant from another, in the manner of the opposition of the elements? or as
war stands to peace, and life to death, does he also perceive in the essences the conflict which
so exists among all such things, so that they cannot unite one with another, because the
mixture of contraries exerts upon the things mingled a consuming force, as the wisdom of
the Proverbs saith of such a doctrine, that water and fire never say “It is enough668,” express-
ing enigmatically the nature of contraries of equal force and equal balance, and their mutual
destruction? Or is it in none of these ways that he sees “variance” in the essences? Let him
tell us, then, what he conceives besides these. He could not say, I take it, even if he were to
repeat his wonted phrase669, “The Son is variant from Him Who begat Him”; for thereby
the absurdity of his statements is yet more clearly shown. For what mutual relation is so
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closely and concordantly engrafted and fitted together as that meaning of relation to the
Father expressed by the word “Son”? And a proof of this is that even if both of these names
be not spoken, that which is omitted is connoted by the one that is uttered, so closely is the
one implied in the other, and concordant with it: and both of them are so discerned in the
668 Cf. Prov. xxx. 15 (LXX.).
669 The sense given would perhaps be clearer if we were to read (as Gulonius seems to have done) ἀσυνήθη
for συνήθη. This might be interpreted, “He could not say, I take it, even if he uses the words in an unwonted
sense, that the Son is at variance with Him Who begat Him.” The συνήθη would thus be the senses already
considered and set aside: and the point would be that such a statement could not be made without manifest
absurdity, even if some out-of-the-way sense were attached to the words. As the passage stands, it must mean
that even if Eunomius repeats his wonted phrase, that can suggest no other sense of “variance” than those enu-
merated.
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He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father…