22. If then any man conceives God to be compound,
as accident συμβεβηκός. Cf. Orat. iv. 2. also Orat. i. 36. The text
embodies the common doctrine of the Fathers. Athenagoras, however,
speaks of God’s goodness as an accident, ‘as colour to the
body,’ ‘as flame is ruddy and the sky blue,’
Legat. 24. This, however is but a verbal difference, for shortly
before he speaks of His being, τὸ ὄντως
ὂν, and His unity of nature,
τὸ
μονοφυὲς, as in the number of ἐπισυμβεβηκότα
αὐτῶ. Eusebius uses the
word συμβεβηκὸς
in the same way [but see Orat. iv. 2, note 8],
Demonstr. Evang. iv. 3. And hence S. Cyril, in controversy with
the Arians, is led by the course of their objections to observe,
‘There are cogent reasons for considering these things as
accidents συμβεβηκότα
in God, though they be not.’ Thesaur. p.
263. vid. the following note. is in essence, or to have any external envelopement περιβολὴ, and so de Syn. §34. which is very much the
same passage. Some Fathers, however, seem to say the reverse. E.g.
Nazianzen says that ‘neither the immateriality of God nor
ingenerateness, present to us His essence.’ Orat. 28. 9.
And S. Augustine, arguing on the word ingenitus, says, that ‘not
every thing which is said to be in God is said according to
essence.’ de Trin. v. 6. And hence, while Athan. in the
text denies that there are qualities or the like belonging to
Him, περὶ
αὐτὸν, it is still
common in the Fathers to speak of qualities, as in the passage of S.
Gregory just cited, in which the words περὶ θεὸν occur. There is no difficulty in reconciling these
statements, though it would require more words than could be given to
it here. Petavius has treated the subject fully in his work de
Deo. i. 7–11. and especially ii. 3. When the Fathers say that
there is no difference between the divine ‘proprietates’
and essence, they speak of the fact, considering the Almighty as He is;
when they affirm a difference, they speak of Him as contemplated by us,
who are unable to grasp the idea of Him as one and simple, but view His
Divine Nature as if in projection (if such a word may be used),
and thus divided into substance and quality as man may be divided into
genus and difference., and to be encompassed, or as if there is
aught about Him which completes the essence, so that when we say
‘God,’ or name ‘Father,’ we do not signify the
invisible and incomprehensible essence, but something about it, then
let them complain of the Council’s stating that the Son was from
the essence of God; but let them reflect, that in thus considering they
utter two blasphemies; for they make God corporeal, and they falsely
say that the Lord is not Son of the very Father, but of what is about
Him. But if God be simple, as He is, it follows that in saying
‘God’ and naming ‘Father,’ we name nothing as
if about Him, but signify his essence itself. For though to comprehend
what the essence of God is be impossible, yet if we only understand
that God is, and if Scripture indicates Him by means of these titles,
we, with the intention of indicating Him and none else, call Him God
and Father and Lord. When then He says, ‘I am that I am,’
and ‘I am the Lord God Ex. iii. 14,
15.,’ or when
Scripture says, ‘God,’ we understand nothing else by it but
the intimation of His incomprehensible essence Itself, and that He Is,
who is spoken of In like
manner de Synod. §34. Also Basil, ‘The essence is not
any one of things which do not attach, but is the very being of
God.’ contr. Eun. i. 10 fin. ‘The nature of God is
no other than Himself, for He is simple and uncompounded.’ Cyril
Thesaur. p. 59. ‘When we say the power of the Father, we
say nothing else than the essence of the Father.’ August. de
Trin. vii. 6. And so Numenius in Eusebius, ‘Let no one
deride, if I say that the name of the Immaterial is essence and
being.’ Præp. Evang. xi. 10.. Therefore let no one
be startled on hearing that the Son of God is from the Essence of the
Father; but rather let him accept the explanation of the Fathers, who
in more explicit but equivalent language have for ‘from
God’ written ‘of the essence.’ For they considered it
the same thing to say that the Word was ‘of God’ and
‘of the essence of God,’ since the word ‘God,’
as I have already said, signifies nothing but the essence of Him Who
Is. If then the Word is not in such sense from God, as a son, genuine
and natural, from a father, but only as creatures because they are
framed, and as ‘all things are from God,’ then neither is
He from the essence of the Father, nor is the Son again Son according
to essence, but in consequence of virtue, as we who are called sons by
grace. But if He only is from God, as a genuine Son, as He is, then the
Son may reasonably be called from the essence of God.