Nay, even the forecasting by our
calculations will be quite useless; virtue will lose its value; and to
turn from evil will not be worth the while. Everything will be entirely
under the control of the driver, Chance; and our lives will differ not
at all from vessels devoid of ballast, and will drift on waves of
unaccountable circumstances, now to this, now to that incident of good
or of evil. The treasures of virtue will never be found in those who
owe their constitution to causes quite contrary to virtue. If God
really superintends our life, then, confessedly, evil cannot begin it.
But if we do owe our birth to evil, then we must go on living in
complete uniformity with it. Thereby it will be shown that it is folly
to talk about the “houses of correction” which await us
after this life is ended, and the “just recompenses,” and
all the other things there asserted, and believed in too, that tend to
the suppression of vice: for how can a man, owing, as he does, his
birth to evil, be outside its pale? How can he, whose very nature has
its rise in a vice, as they assert, possess any deliberate impulse
towards a life of virtue? Take any single one of the brute creation; it
does not attempt to speak like a human being, but in using the natural
kind of utterance sucked in, as it were, with its mother’s milk συντρόφῳ, it deems it no loss to be deprived of
articulate speech. Just in the same way those who believe that a vice
was the origin and the cause of their being alive will never bring
themselves to have a longing after virtue, because it will be a thing
quite foreign to their nature. But, as a fact ἀλλὰ
μὴν introduces a fact into the
argument (cf. καὶ
μὴν); Lat. “verum
enimvero.”,
they who by reflecting have cleansed the vision of their soul do all of
them desire and strive after a life of virtue. Therefore it is by that
fact clearly proved that vice is not prior in time to the act of
beginning to live, and that our nature did not thence derive its
source, but that the all-disposing wisdom of God was the Cause of it:
in short, that the soul issues on the stage of life in the manner which
is pleasing to its Creator, and then (but not before), by virtue of its
power of willing, is free to choose that which is to its mind, and so,
whatever it may wish to be, becomes that very thing. We may understand
this truth by the example of the eyes. To see is their natural state;
but to fail to see results to them either from choice or from disease.
This unnatural state may supervene instead of the natural, either by
wilful shutting of the eyes or by deprivation of their sight through
disease. With the like truth we may assert that the soul derives its
constitution from God, and that, as we cannot conceive of any vice in
Him, it is removed from any necessity of being vicious; that
nevertheless, though this is the condition in which it came into being,
it can be attracted of its own free will in a chosen direction, either
wilfully shutting its eyes to the Good, or letting them be damaged τὸν
ὀφθαλμὸν
βλαπτομένην by that insidious foe whom we have taken
home to live with us, and so passing through life in the darkness of
error; or, reversely, preserving undimmed its sight of the Truth and
keeping far away from all weaknesses that could darken it.—But
then some one will ask, “When and how did it come into
being?” Now as for the question, how any single thing came into
existence, we must banish it altogether from our discussion. Even in
the case of things which are quite within the grasp of our
understanding and of which we have sensible perception, it would be
impossible for the speculative reason λόγῳ. to
grasp the “how” of the production of the phenomenon; so
much so, that even inspired and saintly men have deemed such questions
insoluble. For instance, the Apostle says, “Through faith we
understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that
things which are seen are not made of things which do appear Heb. xi. 3..” He would not, I take it, have spoken
like that, if he had thought that the question could be settled by any
efforts of the reasoning powers. While the Apostle affirms that it is
an object of his faith that it is an object of his faith, &c. In the Greek the μὲν contrasts the
Apostle’s declaration on this point with his silence as to the
“how.” that it was by the
will of God that the world itself and all which is therein was framed
(whatever this “world” be that involves the idea of the
whole visible and invisible creation), he has on the other hand left
out of the investigation the “how” of this framing. Nor do
I think that this point can ever be reached by any inquirers. The
question presents, on the face of it, many insuperable difficulties.
How, for instance, can a world of movement come from one that is at
rest? how from the simple and undimensional that which shows dimension
and compositeness? Did it come actually out of the Supreme Being? But
the fact that this world presents a difference in kind to that Being
militates against militates against, &c.
᾽Αλλ᾽ οὐχ
ὁμολογεῖται
(reading then, ὅτι
τὸ
ἑτερογενὲς
ἔχει πρὸς
ἐκείνην τὰ
ὄντα). Cf. Plato,
Tim. 29 C, αὐτοὶ
αὑτοῖς οὐχ
ὁμολογούμενοι
λόγοι,
“theories that contradict each other.” This world
cannot come out of the Supreme Being: its alien nature contradicts
that. Krabinger’s translation is therefore wrong, “sed non
constat:” and Oehler’s, “Aber das ist nicht
angemacht.” such a supposition. Did it then
come from some other quarter? Yet Faith ὁ λόγος.
can contemplate nothing as quite outside the Divine Nature; for we
should have to believe in two distinct and separate Principles, if
outside the Creative Cause we are to suppose something else, which the
Artificer, with all His skill, has to put under contribution for the
formative processes of the Universe. Since, then, the Cause of all
things is one, and one only, and yet the existences produced by that
Cause are not of the same nature as its transcendent quality, an
inconceivability of equal magnitude Reading ἴση δὴ. arises in both
our suppositions, i.e. both that the creation comes straight out
of the Divine Being, and that the universe owes its existence to some
cause other than Him; for if created things are to be of the same
nature as God, we must consider Him to be invested with the properties
belonging to His creation; or else a world of matter, outside the
circle of God’s substance, and equal, on the score of the absence
in it of all beginning, to the eternity of the Self-existent One, will
have to be ranged against Him: and this is in fact what the followers
of Manes, and some of the Greek philosophers who held opinions of equal
boldness with his, did imagine; and they raised this imagination into a
system. In order, then, to avoid falling into either of these
absurdities, which the inquiry into the origin of things involves, let
us, following the example of the Apostle, leave the question of the
“how” in each created thing, without meddling with it at
all, but merely observing incidentally that the movement of God’s
Will becomes at any moment that He pleases a fact, and the intention
becomes at once realized in Nature ἡ φύσις.; for
Omnipotence does not leave the plans of its far-seeing skill in the
state of unsubstantial wishes: and the actualizing of a wish is
Substance. In short, the whole world of existing things falls into two
divisions: i.e. that of the intelligible, and that of the
corporeal: and the intelligible creation does not, to begin with, seem
to be in any way at variance with a spiritual Being, but on the
contrary to verge closely upon Him, exhibiting as it does that absence
of tangible form and of dimension which we rightly attribute to His
transcendent nature. The corporeal creation The
long Greek sentence, which begins here with a genitive absolute
(τῆς δὲ
σωματικῆς
κτίσεως,
κ.τ.λ.), leading up to nothing
but the anacoluthon περὶ ὧν
τοσοῦτον
κ.τ.λ., has been broken up in
translating. Doubtless this anacoluthon can be explained by the
sentences linked on to the last words (τῷ λόγῳ)
of the genitive clause, which are so long as to throw that clause quite
into the background. There is no need therefore to take the words where
this anacoluthon begins, down to σῶμα
γίνεται, as
a parenthesis, with Krabinger and Oehler; especially as the words that
follow γίνεται are a direct recapitulation of what immediately
precedes.,
on the other hand, must certainly be classed amongst specialities that
have nothing in common with the Deity; and it does offer this supreme
difficulty to the Reason; namely, that the Reason cannot see how
the visible comes out of the invisible, how the hard solid comes
out of the intangible, how the finite comes out of the infinite,
how that which is circumscribed by certain proportions, where
the idea of quantity comes in, can come from that which has no size, no
proportions, and so on through each single circumstance of body. But
even about this we can say so much: i.e. that not one of those
things which we attribute to body is itself body; neither figure, nor
colour, nor weight, nor extension, nor quantity, nor any other
qualifying notion whatever; but every one of them is a category; it is
the combination of them all into a single whole that constitutes body.
Seeing, then, that these several qualifications which complete the
particular body are grasped by thought alone, and not by sense, and
that the Deity is a thinking being, what trouble can it be to such a
thinking agent to produce the thinkables whose mutual combination
generates for us the substance of that body? All this
discussion, however, lies outside our present business. The previous
question was,—If some souls exist anterior to their bodies,
when and how do they come into existence? and of this
question Reading, as Dr. H. Schmidt conjectures, καὶ τούτου
πάλιν, cf. 205
C., again, the part about the how,
has been left out of our examination and has not been meddled with, as
presenting impenetrable difficulties. There remains the question of the
when of the soul’s commencement of existence: it follows
immediately on that which we have already discussed. For if we were to
grant that the soul has lived previous to its body Origen, Gregory’s master in most of his theology, did teach
this very thing, the pre-existence of the soul: nor did he attempt to
deny that some degree of transmigration was a necessary
accompaniment of such teaching; only he would adjust the moral meaning
of it. Cf. c. Celsum, Lib. iii. 75. “And even if we should
treat (i e. medically) those who have caught the folly of the
transmigration of souls from doctors who push down a reasoning nature
into any of the unreasoning natures, or even into that which is
insensate, how can any say that we shall not work improvement in their
souls by teaching them that the bad do not have allotted to them by way
of punishment that insensate or unreasoning state, but that what is
inflicted by God upon the bad, be it pain or affliction, is only in the
way of a very efficacious cure for them? This is the teaching of the
wise Christian: he attempts to teach the simpler of his flock as
fathers do the merest infants.” Not the theory itself, but the
exaggeration of it, is here combated. in some place of resort peculiar to itself,
then we cannot avoid seeing some force in all that fantastic teaching
lately discussed, which would explain the soul’s habitation of
the body as a consequence of some vice. Again, on the other hand, no
one who can reflect will imagine an after-birth of the soul,
i.e. that it is younger than the moulding of the body; for every
one can see for himself that not one amongst all the things that are
inanimate or soulless possesses any power of motion or of growth; whereas there
is no question about that which is bred in the uterus both growing and
moving from place to place. It remains therefore that we must think
that the point of commencement of existence is one and the same for
body and soul. Also we affirm that, just as the earth receives the
sapling from the hands of the husbandman and makes a tree of it,
without itself imparting the power of growth to its nursling, but only
lending it, when placed within itself, the impulse to grow, in this
very same way that which is secreted from a man for the planting of a
man is itself to a certain extent a living being as much gifted with a
soul and as capable of nourishing itself as that from which it comes ἐκ
τρεφομένου
τρεφόμενον. If this offshoot, in its diminutiveness,
cannot contain at first all the activities and the movements of the
soul, we need not be surprised; for neither in the seed of corn is
there visible all at once the ear. How indeed could anything so large
be crowded into so small a space? But the earth keeps on feeding it
with its congenial aliment, and so the grain becomes the ear, without
changing its nature while in the clod, but only developing it and
bringing it to perfection under the stimulus of that nourishment. As,
then, in the case of those growing seeds the advance to perfection is a
graduated one κατὰ
λόγον., so in man’s
formation the forces of his soul show themselves in proportion to the
size to which his body has attained. They dawn first in the fœtus,
in the shape of the power of nutrition and of development: after that,
they introduce into the organism that has come into the light the gift
of perception: then, when this is reached, they manifest a certain
measure of the reasoning faculty, like the fruit of some matured plant,
not growing all of it at once, but in a continuous progress along with
the shooting up of that plant. Seeing, then, that that which is
secreted from one living being to lay the foundations of another living
being cannot itself be dead (for a state of deadness arises from the
privation of life, and it cannot be that privation should precede the
having), we grasp from these considerations the fact that in the
compound which results from the joining of both (soul and body) there
is a simultaneous passage of both into existence; the one does not come
first, any more than the other comes after. But as to the number of
souls, our reason must necessarily contemplate a stopping some day of
its increase; so that Nature’s stream may not flow on for ever,
pouring forward in her successive births and never staying that onward
movement. The reason for our race having some day to come to a
standstill is as follows, in our opinion: since every intellectual
reality is fixed in a plenitude of its own, it is reasonable to expect
that humanity This
seems like a prelude to the Realism of the Middle Ages. also will arrive at
a goal (for in this respect also humanity is not to be parted from the
intellectual world Each
individual soul represents, to Gregory’s view, a
“thought” of God, which becomes visible by the soul being
born. There will come a time when all these “thoughts,”
which complete, and do not destroy, each other, will have completed
the πλήρωμα (Humanity) which the Deity contemplates. This immediate apparition
of a soul, as a “thought” of God, is very unlike the
teaching of his master Origen: and yet more sober, and more
scriptural.); so that we are to
believe that it will not be visible for ever only in defect, as it is
now: for this continual addition of after generations indicates that
there is something deficient in our race.