Testimonia

Publiek archief van verzamelde en verwerkte bronrecords.
Overzicht / tekstblob

Tekstblob

sha256: 42dde5be7041033232411b1ec4c4991d53a3d133f0b066714f5cf81bc6fe3a29 · 3,620 tekens

can be proved to a demonstration from it: but that this discourse may not be lengthened out too much, that must be omitted for the present. 161 From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ in some sense may be said to die for all, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, the whole world, by his death; vet there must be something particular in the design of his death, with respect to such as he intended should actually be saved thereby. As appears by what has been now shown, God has the actual salvation or redemption of a certain number in his proper absolute design, and of a certain number only; and therefore such a design only can be prosecuted in any thing God does, in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a proper design of the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to die, and prosecutes such a design with respect to no other, most strictly speaking; for it is impossible, that God should prosecute any other design than only such as he has: he certainly does not, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a design that he has not. And, indeed, such a particularity and limitation of redemp- tion will as infallibly follow, from the doctrine of God s foreknowledge, as from that of the decree. For it is as impossible, in strictness of speech, that God should prosecute a design, or aim at a thing, which he at the same time most perfectly knows will not be accomplished, as that he should use endeavours for that which is beside his decree. 162 By the things which have been proved, are obviated some of the main objections against the doctrine of the infallible and necessary perseverance of saints, and some of the main foundations of this doctrine are established. The main prejudices of Arminians against this doctrine seem to be these; they suppose such a necessary, infallible perseverance to be repug- nant to the freedom of the Will; that it must be owing to man’s own self-determining power he first becomes virtuous and holy; and so, in like manner, it must be left a thing contingent, 161 Certain foreknowledge does imply some necessity. But our author is not sufficiently guarded, or else not sufficiently explicit, when he says, that foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree. For certainty, or hypo- thetical necessity, may arise from the nature of things, and from negative causes. as well as from a decree. If. indeed, the remark be limited to the subject immediately preceding, it is an important truth.—W. 162 The terms design and endeavours are not sufficiently discriminating. It is here supposed that it is unworthy of God to use endeavours which are beside his decree, or to prosecute a design which he knows will not be ac- complished. Is it not a matter of plain fact that he uses endeavours which are beside his decree, and prosecutes a design which he knows will not be accomplished, through the whole system of legislation and government? Is it not the very design of legislation and government to prevent crimes as well as to punish them, and to promote obedience and conformity to law? Legislative design, therefore, is not accomplished in the commission of crimes, otherwise the legislator, as such, could not find fault for breach of law. Our Lord used endeavours with the in- habitants of Jerusalem, &c. beside his decree, yet with perfect propriety. If we keep in mind that the divine Will subsists under two relations, according to the two-fold state of man, who is at once a subject of decree and a subject of government, we shall see the propriety of calling it decretive and rectoral. 764 SECTION XIV. The Conclusion.

Alle records · Zoek op deze hash