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§2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and
thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner, with his discourse concerning
“generated” and “ungenerate.”
Now seeing that the Only-begotten is in the Divine Scriptures proclaimed to be God,
let Eunomius consider his own argument, and condemn for utter folly the man who parts
the Divine into created and uncreated, as he does him who divides “man” into “horse” and
“man.” For he himself says, a little further on, after his intermediate nonsense, “the close
relation of names to things is immutable,” where he himself by this statement assents to the
fixed character of the true connection of appellations with their subject. If, then, the name
of Godhead is properly employed in close connection with the Only-begotten God (and
Eunomius, though he may desire to be out of harmony with us, will surely concede that the
Scripture does not lie, and that the name of the Godhead is not inharmoniously attributed
to the Only-begotten), let him persuade himself by his own reasoning that if “the close rela-
tion of names to things is immutable,” and the Lord is called by the name of “God,” he
cannot apprehend any difference in respect of the conception of Godhead between the
Father and the Son, seeing that this name is common to both,—or rather not this name
only, but there is a long list of names in which the Son shares, without divergence of
meaning, the appellations of the Father,—“good,” “incorruptible,” “just,” “judge,” “long-
suffering,” “merciful,” “eternal,” “everlasting,” all that indicate the expression of majesty of
nature and power,—without any reservation being made in His case in any of the names in
regard of the exalted nature of the conception. But Eunomius passes by, as it were with
closed eye, the number, great as it is, of the Divine appellations, and looks only to one point,
his “generate and ungenerate,”—trusting to a slight and weak cord his doctrine, tossed and
driven as it is by the blasts of error.
He asserts that “no man who has any regard for the truth either calls any generated
thing ‘ungenerate,’ or calls God Who is over all ‘Son’ or ‘generate.’” This statement needs
no further arguments on our part for its refutation. For he does not shelter his craft with
any veils, as his wont is, but treats the inversion of his absurd statement as equivalent833,
while he says that neither is any generated thing spoken of as “ungenerate,” nor is God Who
is over all called “Son” or “generate,” without making any special distinction for the Only-
begotten Godhead of the Son as compared with the rest of the “generated,” but makes his
opposition of “all things that have come into being” to “God” without discrimination, not
excepting the Son from “all things.” And in the inversion of his absurdities he clearly separ-
833 That is, in making a rhetorical inversion of a proposition in itself objectionable, he so re-states it as to
make it really a different proposition while treating it as equivalent. The original proposition is objectionable
as classing the Son with all generated existences: the inversion of it, because the term “God” is substituted illicitly
for the term “ungenerate.”
He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most excellent manner, with his discourse concerning “generated” and “ungenerate.”
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He then declares that the close relation between names and things is immutable,…