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anything which it had within the sphere of its own experience. But how different the actual
facts of the case are is a point requiring no evidence from without, it is acknowledged by
every one who consults his own consciousness. In vain, moreover, is it pleaded by those
who affirm that the soul is a part of God, that the corruption and baseness which we see in
the worst of men, and the weakness and blemishes which we see in all men, come to it not
from the soul itself, but from the body; for what matters it whence the infirmity originates
in that which, if it were indeed immutable, could not, from any quarter whatever, be made
infirm? For that which is truly immutable and incorruptible is not liable to mutation or
corruption by any influence whatever from without, else the invulnerability which the fable
ascribed to the flesh of Achilles would be nothing peculiar to him, but the property of every
man, so long as no accident befell him. That which is liable to be changed in any manner,
by any cause, or in any part whatever, is therefore not by nature immutable; but it were
impiety to think of God as otherwise than truly and supremely immutable: therefore the
soul is not a part of God.
4. That the soul is immaterial is a fact of which I avow myself to be fully persuaded, al-
though men of slow understanding are hard to be convinced that it is so. To secure myself,
however, from either unnecessarily causing to others or unreasonably bringing upon myself
a controversy about an expression, let me say that, since the thing itself is beyond question,
it is needless to contend about mere terms. If matter be used as a term denoting everything
which in any form has a separate existence, whether it be called an essence, or a substance,
or by another name, the soul is material. Again, if you choose to apply the epithet immater-
ial only to that nature which is supremely immutable and is everywhere present in its entirety,
the soul is material, for it is not at all endowed with such qualities. But if matter be used to
designate nothing but that which, whether at rest or in motion, has some length, breadth,
and height, so that with a greater part of itself it occupies a greater part of space, and with
a smaller part a smaller space, and is in every part of it less than the whole, then the soul is
not material. For it pervades the whole body which it animates, not by a local distribution
of parts, but by a certain vital influence, being at the same moment present in its entirety
in all parts of the body, and not less in smaller parts and greater in larger parts, but here
with more energy and there with less energy, it is in its entirety present both in the whole
body and in every part of it. For even that which the mind perceives in only a part of the
body is nevertheless not otherwise perceived than by the whole mind; for when any part of
the living flesh is touched by a fine pointed instrument, although the place affected is not
only not the whole body, but scarcely discernible in its surface, the contact does not escape
the entire mind, and yet the contact is felt not over the whole body, but only at the one point
where it takes place. How comes it, then, that what takes place in only a part of the body is
immediately known to the whole mind, unless the whole mind is present at that part, and
at the same time not deserting all the other parts of the body in order to be present in its
1116
To Jerome