respecting those things of which he presumes to be the interpreter. For, quoting certain of
the Master’s speculations on the faculty of conception, in which he shows that its exercise
finds place, not only in reference to vain and trivial objects, but that it is competent to deal
also with weightier matters, he, by means of his speculation about the corn, and seed, and
other food (in Genesis), brings Basil into court with the charge, that his language is a follow-
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ing of pagan philosophy1103, and that he is circumscribing Divine Providence, as not allowing
that words were given to things by God, and that he is fighting in the ranks of the Atheists,
and taking arms against Providence, and that he admires the doctrines of the profane rather
than the laws of God, and ascribes to them the palm of wisdom, not having observed in the
earliest of the sacred records, that before the creation of man, the naming of fruit and seed
are mentioned in Holy Writ.
Such are his charges against us; not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseo-
logy, for we have made such alterations as were required to correct the ruggedness and
harshness of his style. What, then, is our answer to this careful guardian of Divine Providence?
1103 τῃ ἔξωθεν φιλοσοφί& 139·. Eunomius, in this accusation, must have been thinking, in the θέσει and
φύσει controversy on the origin of language, of Democritus, who called words “statues in sound,” i.e. ascribed
to them a certain amount of artificiality. But it is doubtful whether the opinion of the purely human origin of
language can be ascribed to him, when we consider another expression of his, that “words were statues in sound,
but statues not made by the hands of men, but by the gods themselves.” Language with him was conventional,
but it was not arbitrary. Again, Plato defines a word, an imitation in sound of that which it imitates (Cratylus,
423 B), and Aristotle calls words imitations (Rhet. iii. 1). But both of them were very far indeed from tracing
language back to mere onamatopœia, i.e. ascribing it to θέσις (agreement), as opposed to φύσις in the sense of
the earlier Greek philosophy, the “essence” of the thing named, rather than the “nature” of the names. Long
before them Pythagoras had said, “the wisest of all things is Number, and next to Number, that which gives
names.” These oracular words do not countenance the idea that the origin of language was purely human. Perhaps
Epicurus more definitely than any taught that in the first formation of language men acted unconsciously, moved
by nature (in the modern sense), and that then as a second stage there was an agreement or understanding to
use a certain sound for a certain conception. Against this Heraclitus (b.c. 503) had taught that words exist φύσει.
“Words are like the shadows of things, like the pictures of trees and mountains reflected in the river, like our
own images when we look into a mirror.” We know at all events here what he did not mean, viz., that man imposed
what names he pleased on the objects round him. Heraclitus’ “nature” is a very different thing from the Darwinian
Nature; it is the inherent fitness between the object and name. Eunomius, then, was hardly justified in calling
the Greek philosophy, as a whole, atheistical in this matter, and “against Providence.” This φύσις, the impalpable
force in the things named, could still be represented as the will of the Deity. Eunomius outdoes Origen even, or
any Christian writer, in contending for the sacredness of names. He makes the Deity the name-giver, but with
the sole object of deifying his “Ungenerate.” Perhaps Basil’s teaching of the human faculty of ᾽Επίνοια working
under God as the name-giver is the truest statement of all, and harmonizes most with modern thought.
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.