St. Basil’s view of slavery is that (a) as regards our relation to God, all created beings are naturally in a condition of subservience to the Creator; (b) as regards our relationship to one another, slavery is not of nature, but of convention and circumstance.  How far he is here at variance with the well known account of slavery given by Aristotle in the first book of the Politics will depend upon the interpretation we put upon the word “nature.”  “Is there,” asks Aristotle, “any one intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?  There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and fact.  For that some should rule, and others be ruled, is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.…Where, then, there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business it is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them, as for all inferiors, that they should be under the rule of a master.…It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.”  Politics, Bk. 1, Sec. 5.  Here by Nature seems to be meant something like Basil’s “lack of intelligence,” and of the τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἄρχον, which makes it “profitable” for one man to be the chattel of another (κτῆμα is livestock, especially mancipium.  cf. Shakespeare’s K. and Pet., “She is my goods, my chattels.”  “Chattel” is a doublet of “cattle”).  St. Basil and Aristotle are at one as to the advantage to the weak slave of his having a powerful protector; and this, no doubt, is the point of view from which slavery can be best apologized for. Christianity did indeed do much to better the condition of the slave by asserting his spiritual freedom, but at first it did little more than emphasize the latter philosophy of heathendom, εἰ σῶμα δοῦλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς ἐλεύθερος (Soph., frag. incert. xxii.), and gave the highest meaning to such thoughts as those expressed in the late Epigram of Damascius (c. 530) on a dead slave: Ζωσίμη ἡ πρὶν ἐοῦσα μόνῳ τῷ σώματι δούλη, Καὶ τῷ σώματι νῦν εὗρεν ἐλευθερίην. It is thought less of a slave’s servitude to fellow man than of the slavery of bond and free alike to evil.  cf. Aug., De Civit. Dei. iv. cap. iii.  “Bonus etiamsi serviat liber est:  malus autem si regnat servus est:  nec est unius hominis, sed quod gravius est tot dominorum quot vitiorum.”  Chrysostom even explains St. Paul’s non-condemnation of slavery on the ground that its existence, with that of Christian liberty, was a greater moral triumph than its abolition.  (In Genes. Serm. v. 1.)  Even so late as the sixth century the legislation of Justinian, though protective, supposed no natural liberty.  “Expedit enim respublicæ ne quis re suâ utatur male.”  Instit. i. viii. quoted by Milman, Lat. Christ. ii. 14.  We must not therefore be surprised at not finding in a Father of the fourth century an anticipation of a later development of Christian sentiment.  At the same time it was in the age of St. Basil that “the language of the Fathers assumes a bolder tone” (cf. Dict. Christ. Ant. ii. 1905), and “in the correspondence of Gregory Nazianzen we find him referring to a case where a slave had been made bishop over a small community in the desert.  The Christian lady to whom he belonged endeavoured to assert her right of ownership, for which she was severely rebuked by St. Basil (cf. Letter CXV.)  After St. Basil’s death she again claimed the slave, whereupon Gregory addressed her a letter of grave remonstrance at her unchristian desire to recall his brother bishop from his sphere of duty.  Ep. 79,” id.