Chapter VIII.
Let no one think however that herein we depreciate marriage as an institution. We are
well aware that it is not a stranger to God’s blessing. But since the common instincts of
mankind can plead sufficiently on its behalf, instincts which prompt by a spontaneous bias
to take the high road of marriage for the procreation of children, whereas Virginity in a way
thwarts this natural impulse, it is a superfluous task to compose formally an Exhortation to
marriage. We put forward the pleasure of it instead, as a most doughty champion on its
behalf. It may be however, notwithstanding this, that there is some need of such a treatise,
occasioned by those who travesty the teaching of the Church. Such persons1378 “have their
conscience seared with a hot iron,” as the Apostle expresses it; and very truly too, considering
that, deserting the guidance of the Holy Spirit for the “doctrines of devils,” they have some
ulcers and blisters stamped upon their hearts, abominating God’s creatures, and calling
them “foul,” “seducing,” “mischievous,” and so on. “But what have I to do to judge them
that are without1379?” asks the Apostle. Truly those persons are outside the Court in which
the words of our mysteries are spoken; they are not installed under God’s roof, but in the
monastery of the Evil One. They “are taken captive by him at his will1380.” They therefore
do not understand that all virtue is found in moderation, and that any declension to either
side1381 of it becomes a vice. He, in fact, who grasps the middle point between doing too
little and doing too much has hit the distinction between vice and virtue. Instances will
make this clearer. Cowardice and audacity are two recognized vices opposed to each other;
the one the defect, the other the excess of confidence; between them lies courage. Again,
piety is neither atheism nor superstition; it is equally impious to deny a God and to believe
in many gods. Is there need of more examples to bring this principle home? The man who
avoids both meanness and prodigality will by this shunning of extremes form the moral
habit of liberality; for liberality is the thing which is neither inclined to spend at random
vast and useless sums, nor yet to be closely calculating in necessary expenses. We need not
go into details in the case of all good qualities. Reason, in all of them, has established virtue
to be a middle state between two extremes. Sobriety itself therefore is a middle state, and
manifestly involves the two declensions on either side towards vice; he, that is, who is
wanting in firmness of soul, and is so easily worsted in the combat with pleasure as never
even to have approached the path of a virtuous and sober life, slides into shameful indulgence;
while he who goes beyond the safe ground of sobriety and overshoots the moderation of
1378 1 Tim. iv. 2.
1379 1 Cor. v. 12.
1380 2 Tim. ii. 16.
1381 ἐπὶ τὰ παρακείμενα. Galesinius wrongly renders “in contrarias partes.” Cf. Arist. Eth. ii. 5.
Chapter VIII
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Chapter VIII