Testimonia

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CHAP. II. CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 305 has always been in use among the Latins, while the Greeks were not ashamed to use a still more presumptuous term, viz., aurggoi/cvov, as if man had still full power in himself. But since the principle entertained by all, even the vul gar, is, that man is endued with free will, while some, who would be thought more skilful, know not how far its power extends ; it will be necessary, first to consider the meaning of the term, and afterwards ascertain, by a simple appeal to Scripture, what man's natural power for good or evil is. The thing meant by free will, though constantly occur ring in all wTriters, few have defined. Origen,1 however, seems to have stated the common opinion when he said, It is a power of reason to discern between good and evil; of will, to choose the one or other. Nor does Augus tine differ from him when he says, It is a power of reason and will to choose the good, grace assisting, — to choose the bad, grace desisting. Bernard, while aiming at greater acuteness, speaks more obscurely, when he describes it as consent, in regard to the indestructible liberty of the will, and the inalienable judgment of reason. Anselm's definition is not very intelligible to ordinary understandings. He calls it a power of preserving rectitude on its own account. Peter Lombard, and the Schoolmen, preferred the definition of Augustine, both because it was clearer, and did not ex clude divine grace, without which they saw that the will was not sufficient of itself. They, however, add something of their own, because they deemed it either better or necessary for clearer explanation. First, they agree that the term will (arbitrium) has reference to reason, whose office it is to distinguish between good and evil, and that the epithet free properly belongs to the will, which may incline either way. Wherefore, since liberty properly belongs to the will, Thomas Aquinas says, (Part I. Quaest. 83, Art. 3,) that the most congruous definition is to call free will an elective power, combining intelligence and appetite, but inclining more to appetite. We now perceive in what it is they suppose 1 Orig. De Principiis, Lib. iii. It is given by Lombard, Lib. ii. Dist. xxiv. Bernard, de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. Anselm, Dialog, de Liber. Arbit. cap. xii. xiii. Lombard, Lib. ii. Dist. xxiv. sec. 5. VOL. I. U

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