CHAP. II. CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 305
has always been in use among the Latins, while the Greeks
were not ashamed to use a still more presumptuous term,
viz., aurggoi/cvov, as if man had still full power in himself.
But since the principle entertained by all, even the vul
gar, is, that man is endued with free will, while some, who
would be thought more skilful, know not how far its power
extends ; it will be necessary, first to consider the meaning
of the term, and afterwards ascertain, by a simple appeal to
Scripture, what man's natural power for good or evil is.
The thing meant by free will, though constantly occur
ring in all wTriters, few have defined. Origen,1 however,
seems to have stated the common opinion when he said, It
is a power of reason to discern between good and evil;
of will, to choose the one or other. Nor does Augus
tine differ from him when he says, It is a power of reason
and will to choose the good, grace assisting, — to choose the
bad, grace desisting. Bernard, while aiming at greater
acuteness, speaks more obscurely, when he describes it as
consent, in regard to the indestructible liberty of the will,
and the inalienable judgment of reason. Anselm's definition
is not very intelligible to ordinary understandings. He calls
it a power of preserving rectitude on its own account.
Peter Lombard, and the Schoolmen, preferred the definition
of Augustine, both because it was clearer, and did not ex
clude divine grace, without which they saw that the will
was not sufficient of itself. They, however, add something
of their own, because they deemed it either better or necessary
for clearer explanation. First, they agree that the term will
(arbitrium) has reference to reason, whose office it is to
distinguish between good and evil, and that the epithet
free properly belongs to the will, which may incline either
way. Wherefore, since liberty properly belongs to the will,
Thomas Aquinas says, (Part I. Quaest. 83, Art. 3,) that the
most congruous definition is to call free will an elective
power, combining intelligence and appetite, but inclining more
to appetite. We now perceive in what it is they suppose
1 Orig. De Principiis, Lib. iii. It is given by Lombard, Lib. ii. Dist.
xxiv. Bernard, de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. Anselm, Dialog, de Liber. Arbit.
cap. xii. xiii. Lombard, Lib. ii. Dist. xxiv. sec. 5.
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