must consist in the love of the love of virtue—and so on in infinitum. For there is no end of
going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning or foundation; it is without beginning,
and hangs on nothing.—Therefore, if the essence of virtue, or beauty of mind, lies in love,
or a disposition to love, it must primarily consist in something different both from compla-
cence, which is a delight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its
object for its foundation. Because it is absurd to say that virtue is primarily and first of all
the consequence of itself; which makes virtue primarily prior to itself.
Nor can virtue primarily consist in gratitude; or one being’s benevolence to another for
his benevolence to him. Because this implies the same inconsistence. For it supposes a bene-
volence prior to gratitude, which is the cause of gratitude. The first benevolence cannot be
gratitude. Therefore there is room left for no other conclusion, than that the primary object
of virtuous love is being, simply considered; or that true virtue primarily consists, not in
love to any particular beings, because of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, because
they love us; but in a propensity and union of heart to being simply considered; exciting
absolute benevolence, if I may so call it, to being in general. I say, true virtue primarily
consists in this. For I am far from asserting, that there is no true virtue in any other love
than this absolute benevolence. But I would express what appears to me to be the truth, on
this subject, in the following particulars.
The first object of a virtuous benevolence is being, simply considered: and if being,
simply considered, be its object, then being in general is its object; and what it has an ultimate
propensity to, is the highest good of being in general. And it will seek the good of every indi-
vidual being unless it be conceived as not consistent with the highest good of being in gen-
eral. In which case the good of a particular being, or some beings, may be given up for the
sake of the highest good of being in general. And particularly, if there be any being statedly
and irreclaimably opposite, and an enemy to being in general, then consent and adherence
to being in general will induce the truly virtuous heart to forsake that enemy, and to oppose
it.
Further, if being, simply considered, be the first object of a truly virtuous benevolence,
then that object who has most of being, or has the greatest share of existence, other things
being equal, so far as such a being is exhibited to our faculties, will have the greatest share
of the propensity and benevolent affections of the heart. I say, “other things being equal,”
especially because there is a secondary object of virtuous benevolence, that I shall take notice
of presently, which must be considered as the ground or motive to a purely virtuous bene-
volence. Pure benevolence in its first exercise is nothing else but being’s uniting consent, or
propensity to being; and inclining to the general highest good, and to each being, whose
867
CHAPTER I. Concerning the essence of true virtue.