palaces and in huts, wigwams, and cells under ground? Is it enough to reply, It happens so,
that men every where, and in all times, choose thus to determine their own wills, and so to
make themselves sinful, as soon as ever they are capable of it, and to sin constantly as long
as they live, and universally to choose never to come up half way to their duty?
A steady effect requires a steady cause; but free will, without any previous propensity
to influence its determinations, is no permanent cause; nothing can be conceived of, farther
from it: for the very notion of freedom of will, consisting in self-determining power, implies
contingence; and if the will is perfectly free from any government of previous inclination,
its freedom must imply the most absolute and perfect contingence: and surely nothing can
be conceived of, more unfixed than that. The notion of liberty of will, in this sense, implies
perfect freedom from every thing that should previously fix, bind, or determine it; that it
may be left to be fixed and determined wholly by itself: therefore its determinations must
be previously altogether unfixed. And can that which is so unfixed, so contingent, be a cause
sufficient to account for an effect, in such a manner, and to such a degree, permanent, fixed,
and constant?
When we see any person going on in a certain course with great constancy, against all
manner of means to dissuade him, do we judge this to be no argument of a fixed disposition
of mind, because, being free, he may determine to do so, if he will, without any such dispos-
ition? Or if we see a nation, or people, that differ greatly from other nations, in such and
such instances of their constant conduct—as though their tempers and inclinations were
very diverse—and any should say, We cannot judge at all of the temper or disposition of
people, by any thing observable in their constant practice or behaviour, because they have
all free will, and therefore may all choose to act so, if they please, without anything in their
temper or inclination to bias them. Would such an account of such effects be satisfying to
the reason of mankind? But infinitely further would it be from satisfying a considerate mind,
to account for the constant and universal sinfulness of mankind, by saying, that their will
is free, and therefore all may, if they please, make themselves wicked: they are free when
they first begin to act as moral agents, and therefore all may, if they please, begin to sin as
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soon as they begin to act: they are free as long as they continue to act in the world, and
therefore they may all commit sin continually, if they will: men of all nations are free, and
therefore all nations may act alike in these respects, if they please, though some do not know
how other nations do act. Men of high and low condition, learned and ignorant, are free,
and therefore they may agree in acting wickedly, if they please, though they do not consult
together. Men in all ages are free, and therefore men in one age may all agree with men in
every other age in wickedness, if they please, though they do not know how men in other
ages have acted, &c. Let every one judge whether such an account of things can satisfy
reason.
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SECTION IX. Several evasions considered.