the principle from whence it proceeds. So, a man being disposed to hate those that hate him,
or to resent injuries done him, arises from self-love, in like manner as loving those that love
us, and being thankful for kindness shown us.
But it is said by some, that it is apparent there is some other principle concerned in ex-
citing the passions of gratitude and anger besides self-love, viz. moral sense, or sense of
moral beauty and deformity, determining the minds of all mankind to approve of, and be
pleased with virtue, and to disapprove of vice, and behold it with displicence; and that their
seeing or supposing this moral beauty or deformity, in the kindness of a benefactor, or op-
position of an adversary, is the occasion of these affections of gratitude or anger. Otherwise,
why are not these affections excited in us towards inanimate things that do us good or hurt?
Why do not we experience gratitude to a garden, or fruitful field? And why are we not angry
with a tempest, or blasting mildew, or an overflowing stream? We are very differently affected
towards those that do us good from the virtue of generosity, or hurt us from the vice of envy
and malice, than towards things that hurt or help us, which are destitute of reason and will.
Concerning this, I would make several remarks.
1. Those who thus argue, that gratitude and anger cannot proceed from self-love, might
argue in the same way, and with equal reason, that neither can these affections arise from
love to others: which is contrary to their own scheme. They say, that the reason why we are
affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral
sense: which they say is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love
to the public, which is naturally in the hearts of all mankind. But now I might say, according
to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot arise from love to others, or love
to the public, or any sense of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For how differently
are we affected towards those that do good or hurt to the public from understanding and
will, and public motive, from what we are towards such inanimate things as the sun and the
clouds, that do good to the public, by enlightening and enlivening beams and refreshing
showers; or mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public, by destroying
the fruits of the earth! Yea, if such a kind of argument be good, it will prove that gratitude
and anger cannot arise from the united influence of self-love, and public love, or moral
sense arising from public affection. For, if so, why are we not affected towards inanimate
things, that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the same manner as to
them that are profitable or hurtful to both on choice and design, and from benevolence or
malice?
2. On the supposition, that men love those who love them, and are angry with those
who hate them, from the natural influence of self-love; it is not at all strange that the Author
of nature, who observes order, uniformity, and harmony in establishing its laws, should so
order, that it should be natural for self-love to cause the mind to be affected differently to-
wards exceedingly different objects; and that it should cause our heart to extend itself in one
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CHAPTER IV. Of self-love and its influence.