that it received its name after the namer came into being. For if we use words for this purpose,
that they may supply us with teaching about the things which they signify, and it is ignorance
alone that requires teaching, while the Divine Nature, as comprehending all knowledge, is
above all teaching, it follows that names were invented to denote the Supreme Being, not
for His sake, but for our own. For He did not attach the term ungeneracy to His nature in
order that He Himself might be instructed. For He Who knoweth all things has no need of
syllables and words to instruct Him as to His own nature and majesty.
But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be
thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certain words and syllables,
labelling, as it were, our mental processes with verbal formulæ to serve as characteristic
notes and indications, with the object of giving a clear and simple declaration of our mental
processes by means of words attached to, and expressive of, our ideas. Why, then, does he
find fault with our contention that the term ungeneracy was devised to indicate the existence
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of God without origin or beginning, and that, independently of all exercise of speech, or si-
lence, or thought, and before the very idea of creation, God was and remains ungenerate?
If, indeed, any one should argue that God was not ungenerate till the name ungeneracy had
been found, the man might be pardonable for writing as he has written, in contravention
of such an absurdity. But if no one denies that He existed before speech and reason,
whereas, while the form of words by which the meaning is expressed is said by us to have
been devised by mental conception, the end and aim of his controversy with us is to show
that the name is not of man’s device, but that it existed before our creation, though by whom
it was spoken I do not know1098, what has the assertion that God existed ungenerately before
all things, and the contention that1099 mental conception is posterior to God, got to do with
this aim of his? For that God is not a conception has been fully demonstrated, so that we
may press him with the same sort of argument, and reply, so to say, in his own words, e.g.
“It is utter folly to regard understanding as of earlier birth than those who exercise it”; or
again, as he proceeds a little below, “Nor as though we intended this, i.e. to make men, the
latest of God’s works of creation, anterior to the conceptions of their own understanding.”
Great indeed would be the force of the argument, if any one of us, out of sheer folly and
madness, should argue that God was a conception of the mind. But if this is not so, nor ever
has been, (for who would go to such a pitch of folly as to assert that He Who alone is, and
Who brought all else whatsoever into being, has no substantial existence of His own, and
1098 Oehler’s reading and stopping are both faulty here, viz., οὐκ οἶδα περὶ τίνος λεγόμενον τί κοινὸν ἔχει
κ.τ.λ. Manifestly the stop should be at λεγόμενον, and the reading of the editt. παρὰ τίνος is right.
1099 It is not necessary to change the τὸ here to τῷ as Oehler suggests. The Munich Cod. omits it altogether.
But he has done good service to the text, by supplying from his Codices all that follows, down to “the same sort
of argument” (except that the first διαγωνίζεσθαι is probably a gloss).
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.