admit, yet he is evidently embarrassed; makes concessions which his general principles of moral necessity did
not require, and shelters himself under covers that afford him in reality no effectual protection. To say, that the
existence of sin is only a common difficulty, which belongs to every hypothesis—that though God is the author
of sin, in some sense, yet he is not the agent, therefore the phrase should be disliked and rejected that though
God wills the event of sin, yet he wills it not as an evil, but for excellent ends—that the events of moral evils are
disposed by wisdom—that God may be the orderer and disposer of moral evil, which in the agent is infinitely
evil, but in the orderer of it no evil at all—that in order to a thing being morally evil it must be unfit and unsuitable,
or of a bad tendency, or from an evil disposition; but that in willing the event of sin neither can be attributed to
God—that if a wise and good man knew, with absolute certainty, that it would be best, all things considered,
there should be moral evil, he might choose that it should be so—that the reason why he might not order it, if
he were able, would not be because he might not desire, but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to
him—and that, in the language of Turnbull, “there is no Eric in the universe,—no absolute evil; sins are evils
only in a partial view, but with respect to the whole system they are not evil or mischievous, but goods,” &c. to
say these things, and more of a similar cast, is not calculated to satisfy a mind that wants the best evidence which
the nature of the case will admit; and we strongly suspect, from his manner of writing, that our author’s own
mind was not satisfied with the solution which he has attempted. In former notes we have had occasion only to
explain principles adopted; or to point out others either more evident, or more radical, on which those of the
author were founded, or with which they stood inseparably connected. But at the close of the present section
we feel ourselves obliged to attempt, at least, the rectification of his principles; or perhaps more properly, to
point out other principles, which, we conceive, are attended with no such embarrassment, are exposed to no
self-contradiction, and which represent the Great Supreme in a much more amiable light The task is indeed
arduous; but let it not be thought impossible; nor let the imperfection of language be confounded with the inad-
equacy of principles. And while we solicit the candour of the reader—whereby he will be prepared to make such
allowances as the nature of the subject requires, be prevented from drawing hasty conclusions of the impractic-
ability of bringing the subject of inquiry to a satisfactory issue, or of presumption in attempting it—we no less
demand a strictness of examination. The real inquirer after truth, the christian divine, and the moral philosophers,
should be solicitous, not to have the “last word,” in controversy, but to make all possible advances in ascertaining
the genuine grounds of acknowledged truths, in discovering radical principles, and in ascertaining their just
bearings and tendencies. 1. The true point of inquiry is—not whether there be moral evil, or whether God be
just? but—how the actual existence of sin, or moral evil, in the universe, is to be reconciled with the moral per-
fections and character of God? Therefore, the thing wanted is a middle term, or argumentative medium, whereby
it may be shown that this proposition is true, viz. There is no real inconsistency between the existence of sin
and the moral perfections of God. 2. We may therefore consider the following propositions as first principles:
axioms. There does exist in the universe moral evil. II. God is infinitely free from injustice, unholiness, and all
imperfections. Hence. corollary. There is no real inconsistent between the existence of moral evil and the moral
perfections of God. 3. Now the question returns. What is the best evidence that there is no such inconsistency?
Those who are satisfied with these plain propositions the axioms, and corollary, may have the evidence of faith,
than there is no inconsistence between the subject and predicate of the last proposition. They may know so
much of God as to be assured, that the existence of sin in the world is no impeachment of the moral character
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SECTION IX. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been…