2. being (one who is) able (this clause is closely bound to the last, and belongs to it, not to the whole sentence. It is in fact a conditioning participial clause to ἵναπροσφέρῃ, and at the same time a retrospective epexegesis of ἐξἀνθρώπωνλαμβανόμενος ) to be compassionate ( ì å ô ñ é ï ð á è Ý ù is a word apparently invented to serve the view of the Peripatetic school, as opposed to the ἀπάθεια of the Stoics. They held that we ought to rule our passions by reason, and denominated such moderation ì å ô ñ é ï ð Ü è å é á. The word is not found,—except in a Pythagorean fragment of Archytas in Stobæus, of doubtful authenticity,—before the time of Alexander: Diog. Laert. v. 31 says, ἔφηδὲ (Aristotle) τὸνσοφὸνμὴεἶναιμὲνἀπαθῆ, μετριοπαθῆδέ. See numerous other examples in Bleek.
Hence we have the verb and its cognates frequently used of moderating the passion of anger: Plut. de Ira Cohib. p. 453, ἀναστῆσαικ. σῶσαικ. ö å ß ó á ó è á é ê. καρτερῆσαιπραότητόςἐστικ. συγγνώμηςκαὶμετριοπαθείας: Appian, Bell. Hisp. p. 529, εἰμετριοπαθῶςσφίσιχρήσεται, παραδοῦσινἑαυτούς: Jos. Antt. xii. 3. 2, Οὐεσπατιάνουδ ʼ ἄντιςκαὶΤίτουτὴνμεγαλοφροσύνηνεἰκότωςἐκπλαγείη, μετὰπολέμουςκ. τηλικούτουςἀγῶνας, οὓςἔσχονπρὸςἡμᾶς, ì å ô ñ é ï ð á è ç ó Ü í ô ù í. So the Etym. Mag., μετριοπαθεῖνἐκμέρουςτὰπάθηκαταδέχεσθαι, ó õ ã ã é í þ ó ê å é í: Hesych. μετριοπαθήςμικρὰπάσχων, ἢσυγγινώσκωνἐπιεικῶς. The meaning here therefore must be given according to this analogy, and the dative following explained as one of direction, or perhaps commodi) towards the ignorant and erring (the former mild word, though frequently used of sinners elsewhere without (e. g.
Hosea 4:15; Sir 5:15; Sir 23:2 al.: Jdt 5:20; Esdr. 8:75 (72): cf. 2 Chronicles 16:9; and so Thl. here, ὅραδέ, ὅτιπᾶνἁμάρτημαἄγνοιακ. πλάνηγεννᾷ ) as well as with the implication of ignorance (see Ecclesiastes 5:5; Leviticus 4:13; Leviticus 5:18), seems to be here placed, as well as ð ë á í ù ì Ý í ï é ò, itself at all events a milder term than ἁμαρτάνουσιν, as suitable to the tone of the sentence, in which the feeling of a sinner towards his fellow-sinners is expressed. The sense might be filled up, ‘towards those who (possibly after all) are ignorant and deluded.’And thus the propriety of the next clause is rendered still greater; both these, ἄγνοια and ð ë Ü í ç, being the results of ἀσθένεια, with which he himself is encompassed. On the exclusion on the one side from these designations of ‘sinners with a high hand,’and the inclusion in them, as above, of much more than sins, strictly speaking, of ignorance, see Delitzsch’s note), seeing that he himself also is compassed about with infirmity (on this construction of an acc. with ð å ñ ß ê å é ì á é, compare ref. Acts: so τεῖχοςπεριβαλέσθαιτὴνπόλιν, Herod. i. 163: Eustath. on Il. ô. p. 1229: ὅραδὲκαὶὅτιτὸπερικεῖσθαιδοτικῇσυνέταξε, λαβὼναὐτὸἀντὶτοῦσυγκεῖσθαικ. περιπεπλέχθαιἡμέντοισυνήθειαἐπὶτοῦβαστάζεινκ. φορεῖντὴνλέξιντίθησικ. αἰτιατικῇσυντάσσει, ὡςἐντῷπερίκειταιτῦφονἢπλοῦτονἢδυνάστειαν. ἀσθένεια, as in ch. Hebrews 7:28, that moral weakness which makes men capable of sin. It is never predicated of Christ in this sense: nay, by the terms of Heb 7:28, He is excluded from it.
That ἀσθένεια of the flesh, which He bore on Him, and thereby was capable of suffering and of death, was entirely distinct from this. Some have gone even further here, as Œc.— τὸ “ περὶἁμαρτιῶν ” εἰπών, σαφῶςἐδήλωσενὅτιἀσθένειαντὴνἁμαρτίανἐκάλεσεν ).