CHAP. I.
CONCERNING THE OBJECTION, THAT TO SUPPOSE MEN BORN IN SIN, WITHOUT THEIR CHOICE, OR ANY PREVIOUS ACT OF THEIR OWN, IS TO SUPPOSE WHAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE NATURE OF SIN.
Some of the objections made against the doctrine of original sin, which have reference to particular arguments used in defence of it, have been already considered in the handling of those arguments. What I shall therefore now consider, are such objections as I have not yet had occasion to notice.
There is no argument Dr. T. insists more upon, than that which is taken from the
Arminian
and
Pelagian
notion of freedom of will, consisting in the will’s
self-determination,
as necessary to the being of moral good or evil. He often urges, that if we come into the world infected with sinful and depraved dispositions, then
sin
must be
natural
to us; and if natural, then
necessary
; and if necessary, then
no
sin, nor
any thing we are blamable for, or that can in any respect be our fault, being what we cannot help: and he urges, that sin must proceed from our own
choice,
&c.
359
Here I would observe in general, that the forementioned notion of freedom of will, as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very existence of virtue and sin, seems to be a grand favourite point with
Pelagians
and
Arminians,
and all divines of such characters, in their controversies with the orthodox. There is no one thing more fundamental in their schemes of religion: on the determination of this one leading point depends the issue of almost all
controversies we have with such divines. Nevertheless, it seems a
needless
task for me particularly to consider that matter in this place; having already largely discussed it, with all the main grounds of this notion, and the arguments used to defend it, in a late book on this subject, to which I ask leave to refer the reader. It is very necessary, that the modern prevailing doctrine concerning this point, should be well understood, and therefore thoroughly considered and examined: for
without it there is no hope of putting an end to the controversy about original sin, and innumerable other controversies that subsist, about many of the main points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the forementioned modern divines, if they can maintain their pecular notion of
freedom,
consisting in the
self-determining power of the will,
as necessary to
moral agency,
and can thoroughly establish it in opposition to the arguments lying against it, then they have an
impregnable castle, to which they may repair, and remain invincible, in all the controversies they have with the reformed divines, concerning
original sin,
the
sovereignty
of grace,
election, redemption, conversion,
the
efficacious operation
of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving
faith
,
perseverance
of the saints, and other principles of the like kind. However, at the same time, I think this will be as strong a fortress for the
Deists,
in
common with them; as the great doctrines, subverted by their notion of
freedom,
are so plainly and abundantly taught in the Scripture. But I am under no apprehensions of any danger, which the cause of Christianity, or the religion of the reformed, is in, from any possibility of
that notion
being ever established, or of its being ever evinced that there is not proper, perfect, and manifold
demonstration
lying against it. But as I said, it would be needless for me to enter
into a particular disquisition of this point here; from which I shall easily be excused by any reader who is willing to give himself the trouble of consulting what I have already written. And as to others, probably they will scarce be at the pains of reading the present discourse; or at least would not, if it should be enlarged by a full consideration of that controversy.
I shall at this time therefore only take notice of some gross
inconsistencies
that Dr. T. has been guilty of, in his handling this objection against the doctrine of original sin. In places which have been cited, he says, that
sin must proceed from our own choice
: and that
if it does not, it being necessary to us, it cannot be sin, it cannot be our fault, or what we are to blame for
:
and therefore all our sin must be chargeable on our
choice,
which is the
cause
of sin: for he says,
the cause of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth, and which proceedeth from it
.
360
Now here are implied several gross contradictions. He greatly insists., that nothing can be
sinful,
or have the nature of sin, but what proceeds from our
choice.
Nevertheless he says, “Not the
effect,
but the
cause
alone is chargeable with
blame.
“ Therefore the
choice,
which is the
cause,
is
alone
blamable, or has the nature of sin; and not the
effect of
that choice. Thus nothing can be sinful, but the effect of
choice; and yet the effect of choice never can be sinful, but only the
cause,
which alone is chargeable with all the blame.
Again, the
choice,
from which sin proceeds, is
itself
sinful. Not only is this implied in his saying, “The
cause
alone is chargeable with all the
blame
;”
but
he expressly speaks of the choice as
faulty
,
361
and calls that choice
wicked,
from which depravity and
corruption proceeds
.
362
Now if the choice itself be
sin,
and there be no sin but what proceeds from a sinful choice, then the sinful choice must proceed from another
antecedent
choice; it must he chosen by a foregoing act of will, determining itself to that sinful choice, that so it may have that which he speaks of as absolutely essential to the nature of
sin,
namely,
that it proceeds from our choice,
and does not happen to us necessarily. But if the sinful choice itself
proceeds from a foregoing choice, then also that foregoing choice must be sinful; it being the
cause of sin,
and so alone chargeable with the
blame.
Yet if that foregoing choice be sinful, then neither must
that
happen to us necessarily, but must like-wise proceed from choice, another act of choice preceding that: for we must remember, that “Nothing is sinful but what proceeds from our
choice.
“ And then, for the same reason, even this prior choice, last
mentioned, must also be sinful, being chargeable with all the blame of that consequent evil choice, which was its effect. And so we must go back till we come to the very
first
volition, the prime or original act of choice in the whole chain. And
this
to be sure must be a
sinful
choice, because this is the
origin
or primitive
cause
of all the train of evils which follow; and according to our author, must therefore be “alone chargeable with all the blame.” And
yet so it is, according to him,
this
“cannot be sinful,” because it does not “proceed from our own choice,” or any foregoing act of our will; it being, by the supposition, the very
first
act of will in the case. And therefore it must be
necessary,
as to us, having no choice of ours to be the cause of it.
In p. 232. he says, ”
Adam’s
sin was from his own
disobedient will
; and so must every man’s sin, and all the sin in the world be, as well as his.” By this, it seems, he must have a “disobedient will”
before
he sins; for the cause must be before the effect: and yet that disobedient will itself is
sinful
; otherwise it could not be called
disobedient.
But the question is, How do men come by the
disobedient will,
this
cause of all the sin in the world? It must not come
necessarily,
without men’s choice; for if so, it is
not
sin, nor is there any
disobedience
in it. Therefore that disobedient will must also come from a
disobedient will
; and so on,
in
infinitum.
Otherwise it must be supposed, that there is some
sin
in the world, which does not
come from a
disobedient will
: contrary to our author’s dogmatical assertions.
In p. 166. S. he says, “Adam
could not sin without a sinful inclination
.” Here he calls that inclination itself
sinful,
which is the principle from whence sinful acts proceed; as elsewhere he speaks of the
disobedient will
from whence all sin comes: and he allows,
363
that “the
law
reaches to all the
latent principles of sin
;” meaning plainly, that it
forbids,
and
threatens punishment
for, those latent principles. Now these latent principles of sin, these sinful inclinations, without which, according to our author, there can be no sinful act, cannot all proceed from a
sinful choice
; because that would imply great contradiction. For, by the supposition, they are the principles from whence a sinful choice
comes, and whence all sinful acts of will proceed; and there can be no sinful act without them. So that the
first
latent principles and inclinations, from whence all sinful acts proceed, are
sinful
; and yet they are
not sinful,
because they do not proceed from a
wicked choice,
without which, according to him, “nothing can be sinful.”
Dr. T. speaking of that proposition of the
Assembly of Divines,
wherein they assert, that
man is by nature utterly corrupt,
&c.
364
thinks himself well warranted, by the supposed great evidence of these his contradictory notions, to say, “Therefore sin is not natural to us; and therefore I shall not scruple to say, this proposition in the
Assembly of Divines
is false.” But it may be worthy of consideration, whether it would not have greatly become him, before he had clothed himself with so much assurance, and proceeded, on the foundation of these his notions, so magisterially to charge the
Assembly’s
proposition with
falsehood,
to have taken care that his own propositions, which he has set in opposition to them, should be a little more
consistent
; that he might not have contradicted
himself,
while contradicting them; lest some impartial judges, observing his inconsistence, should think they had warrant to declare with equal assurance, that “they should not scruple to say, Dr. T.‘s doctrine is false.”
359
Page 125, 128-130, 186-188, 190, 200, 245, 246, 253, 258, 63, 64, 161. S. and other places.
360
Page. 128
361
Page 190.
362
Page 200. See also p. 216.
363
Contents of Rom. chap. vii. in Notes on the epistle.
364
Page 125.