§3. He then shows the eternity of the Son’s generation, and the inseparable identity of His
essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of Eunomius to children playing with
sand.
But since, in what follows, he is active in stirring up the ill savour of his disgusting at-
tempts, whereby he tries to make out that the Only-begotten God “once was not,” it will be
well, as our mind on this head has been made pretty clear by our previous arguments, no
longer to plunge our argument also in what is likewise bad, except perhaps that it is not
unseasonable to add this one point, having selected it from the multitude. He says (some
one having remarked that “the property of not being begotten is equally associated with the
essence of the Father949”), “The argument proceeds by like steps to those by which it came
to a conclusion in the case of the Son.” The orthodox doctrine is clearly strengthened by
the attack of its adversaries, the doctrine, namely, that we ought not to think that not to be
begotten or to be begotten are identical with the essence950, but that these should be con-
templated, it is true, in the subject, while the subject in its proper definition is something
else beyond these, and since no difference is found in the subject, because the difference of
“begotten” and “unbegotten” is apart from the essence, and does not affect it, it necessarily
follows that the essence must be allowed to be in both Persons without variation. Let us
moreover inquire, over and above what has been already said, into this point, in what sense
he says that “generation” is alien from the Father,—whether he does so conceiving of it as
an essence or an operation. If he conceives it to be an operation, it is clearly equally connected
with its result and with its author, as in every kind of production one may see the operation
alike in the product and the producer, appearing in the production of the effects and not
separated from their artificer. But if he terms “generation” an essence separate from the es-
sence of the Father, admitting that the Lord came into being therefrom, then he plainly puts
this in the place of the Father as regards the Only-begotten, so that two Fathers are conceived
in the case of the Son, one a Father in name alone, Whom he calls “the Ungenerate,” Who
has nothing to do with generation, and the other, which he calls “generation,” performing
the part of a Father to the Only-begotten.
And this is brought home even more by the statements of Eunomius himself than by
our own arguments. For in what follows, he says:—“God, being without generation, is also
prior to that which is generate,” and a little further on, “for He Whose existence arises from
being generated did not exist before He was generated.” Accordingly, if the Father has
949 Presumably the quotation from the unknown author, if completed, would run, “as that of being begotten
is associated with the essence of the Son.”
950 If the property of not being begotten is “associated with” the essence, it clearly cannot be the essence, as
Eunomius elsewhere maintains it to be: hence the phrase which he here adopts concedes S. Gregory’s position
on this point.
He then shows the eternity of the Son's generation, and the inseparable identity of His essence with Him that begat Him, and likens the folly of Eunomius to children playing with sand.
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He then shows the eternity of the Son's generation, and the inseparable…