17. This conclusion is most naturally understood to refer to the universal notoriety of the shortness of human life, and to apply only to the subject just treated. Otherwise, if, as many Commentators, we take it for a general conclusion to all that has gone before, we must understand it as Estius, “Jam de his omnibus satis vos admonui, vobis bene nota sunt:”in which case this would hardly be the place for it, considering that more exhortations follow, ch. 5. Grotius takes it to mean, “Moniti estis a me, ignorantiam non potestis obtendere, si quid tale posthac dixeritis, gravior erit culpa:”and so Theile, Wiesinger, De Wette, al. But in this case, why should such a conclusion follow this, rather than any other exhortation? So that ( οὖν here does not prove what follows, but refers the particular case to the general principle; q. d. therefore we see ‘hoc exemplo’the truth of the general axiom, &c.) to him who knoweth to do good (not τὸκαλόν: ê á ë ü í is not any positive good, as beneficence; but merely the opposite of ð ï í ç ñ ü í.
So Wiesinger, rightly: and ποιεῖν is the object after εἰδότι, not the epexegetic inf. as De Wette, “knows the good, that he must do it”) and doeth it not (not merely, omits to do it, as might be the case if it were some one definite deed that was spoken of. It is not sins of omission that men are here convicted of, as so often mistakenly supposed: but the doing ð ï í ç ñ ü í, as in the case of the speech above supposed, where ê á ë ü í is easy and obvious), it is sin to him (i. e. reckoned to him as sin. Schneckenburger well remarks, “Videre licet, Jacobum omnia.…ad thema suum primarium revocare, recti scientiam requirere recti exercitationem”).