merely relative, but more absolute, and a real existence; as when we say an Action; when the
word is not used transitively, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or mind,
without any relation to any object or effect: and as used thus, it is not properly the opposite
of Passion; which ordinarily signifies nothing absolute, but merely the relation of being acted
upon. And therefore if the word Action be used in the like relative sense, then Action and
Passion are only two contrary relations. And it is no absurdity to suppose, that contrary
relations may belong to the same thing at the same time, with respect to different things.
So to suppose, that there are acts of the soul by which a man voluntarily moves, and acts
upon objects, and produces effects, which yet themselves are effects of something else, and
wherein the soul itself is the object of something acting upon, and influencing that, do not
at all confound Action and Passion. The words may nevertheless be properly of opposite
signification: there may be as true and real a difference between acting and being caused to
act, though we should suppose the soul to be both in the same volition, as there is between
living and being quickened, or made to live. It is no more a contradiction, to suppose that
Action may be the effect of some other cause, besides the agent, or being that acts, than to
suppose, that life may be the effect of some other cause, besides the being that lives.
What has led men into this inconsistent notion of Action, when applied to volition—as
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though it were essential to this internal Action, that the agent should be self-determined
in it, and that the Will should be the cause of it—was probably this; that according to the
sense of mankind, and the common use of language, it is so, with respect to men’s external
Actions; which originally, and according to the vulgar use and most proper sense of the
word, are called Actions. Men in these are self-directed, self-determined, and their Wills are
the cause of the motions of their bodies, and the external things done; so that unless men
do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the Action be determined by their antecedent volition,
it is no Action or doing of theirs. Hence some metaphysicians have been led unwarily, but
exceeding absurdly, to suppose the same concerning volition itself, that that also must be
determined by the Will; which is to be determined by antecedent volition, as the motion of
the body is; not considering the contradiction it implies.
But it is very evident, that in the metaphysical distinction between Action and passion,
(though long since become common and the general vogue) due care has not been taken to
conform language to the nature of things, or to any distinct, clear ideas. As it is in innumer-
able other philosophical metaphysical terms, used in these disputes; which has occasioned
inexpressible difficulty, contention, error, and confusion.
And thus probably it came to be thought, that necessity was inconsistent with Action,
as these terms are applied to volition. First, these terms, Action and necessity are changed
from their original meaning, as signifying external voluntary Action and constraint (in
which meaning they are evidently inconsistent) to signify quite other things, viz. volition
itself, and certainty of existence. And when the change of signification is made, care is not
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SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion…