But if it pleases our
adversaries to say that the significance of the term is not operation,
but nature, we shall fall back upon our original argument, that custom
applies the name of a nature to denote multitude erroneously: since
according to true reasoning neither diminution nor increase attaches to
any nature, when it is contemplated in a larger or smaller number. For
it is only those things which are contemplated in their individual
circumscription which are enumerated by way of addition. Now this
circumscription is noted by bodily appearance, and size, and place, and
difference figure and colour, and that which is contemplated apart from
these conditions is free from the circumscription which is formed by
such categories. That which is not thus circumscribed is not
enumerated, and that which is not enumerated cannot be contemplated in
multitude. For we say that gold, even though it be cut into many
figures, is one, and is so spoken of, but we speak of many coins or
many staters, without finding any multiplication of the nature of gold
by the number of staters; and for this reason we speak of gold, when it
is contemplated in greater bulk, either in plate or in coin, as
“much,” but we do not speak of it as “many
golds” on account of the multitude of the material,—except
when one says there are “many gold pieces” (Darics, for
instance, or staters), in which case it is not the material, but the
pieces of money to which the significance of number applies: indeed,
properly, we should not call them “gold” but
“golden.”