SECT. XII.
God’s certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with
such a Contingence of those volitions as is without all Necessity.
Having proved, that God has a certain and infallible Prescience of the voluntary acts of
moral agents, I come now, in the second place, to show the consequence; how it follows
from hence, that these events are necessary, with a Necessity of connexion or consequence.
The chief Arminian divines, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, deny this con-
sequence; and affirm, that if such Foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of any Necessity
of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this matter may be particularly and thoroughly
inquired into. I cannot but think. that on particular and full consideration, it may be perfectly
determined, whether it be indeed so or not.
In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the following things.
l. It is very evident, that, with regard to a thing whose existence is infallibly and indissol-
ubly connected with something which already hath, or has had existence, the existence of
that thing is necessary. Here may be noted the following particulars:
1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessity, that in things which are past,
their past existence is now necessary: having already made sure of existence, it is too late for
any possibility of alteration in that respect; it is now impossible that it should be otherwise
than true, that the thing has existed.
2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents,
that Foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already has, and long ago had ex-
istence; and so, now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise,
than that this Foreknowledge should be or should have been.
3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected with other
things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is ne-
cessarily connected with another proposition, which is necessarily true, is itself necessarily
true. To say otherwise would be a contradiction: it would be in effect to say, that the connex-
36
ion was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, the existence of which
is indissolubly connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not
necessary, then it may possibly not exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connexion of its
existence.—Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.
4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible Foreknowledge of the
future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain, infallible, and indis-
soluble connexion between those events and that Foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the
preceding observations, those events are necessary events; being infallibly and indissolubly
connected with that, whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but
have been.
SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those violations as is without all Necessity.
607
SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…