opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable
to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable
to forbear taking strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent
acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power of a vile
disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and
affection. A strong habit of virtue, and a great degree of holiness, may cause a moral Inability
to love wickedness in general, and may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked
persons or things; or to choose a wicked in preference to a virtuous life. And on the other
hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an Inability to love and
choose holiness; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or to choose
and cleave to him as his chief good.
Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral Inability, viz. of that which is
general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual
moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the heart to all exercises or acts of will of that kind,
through a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect, or want of a certain
kind of inclination. Thus a very ill-natured man may be unable to exert such acts of bene-
volence, as another, who is full of good nature, commonly exerts; and a man whose heart
is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert grateful acts, through that stated defect
of a grateful inclination. By particular and occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability
of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or
of inducements presented to the view of the understanding, on this occasion.—If it be so,
that the Will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an In-
ability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not being possible, in any case,
that the Will should, at present, go against the motive which has now, all things considered,
the greatest advantage to induce it.—The former of these kinds of moral inability is most
commonly called by the name of Inability; because the word, in its most proper and original
signification, has respect to some stated defect. And this especially obtains the name of In-
ability also upon another account:—because, as before observed, the word Inability, in its
original and most common use, is a relative term; and has respect to will and endeavor, as
supposable in the case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the thing desired and endeavored.
Now there may be more of an appearance and shadow of this, with respect to the acts which
arise from a fixed and strong habit, than others that arise only from transient occasions and
causes. Indeed will and endeavour against, or diverse from present acts of the Will are in no
case supposable, whether those acts be occasional or habitual; for that would be to suppose
the Will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present, it is. But yet their may be will and en-
deavour against future acts of the Will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed
at a distance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the Will at one time, may be
against the acts of the Will at another time; and there may be desires and endeavors to prevent
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SECTION IV Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.…