a governing influence in all God’s works, or with respect to every thing he does towards his
creatures. And therefore,
Seventhly, If we use the phrase ultimate end in this highest sense, then the same that is
God’s ultimate end in creating the world, if we suppose but one such end, must be what be
makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in every thing he does either in creation or provid-
ence. But we must suppose, that, in the use to which God puts his creatures, he must evermore
have a regard to the end for which he has made them. But if we take ultimate end in the
other lower sense, God may sometimes have regard to those things as ultimate ends, in
particular works of providence, which could not in any proper sense be his last end in cre-
ating the world.
Eighthly, On the other hand, whatever appears to be God’s ultimate end, in any sense,
of his works of providence in general; that must be the ultimate end of the work of creation
itself. For though God may act for an end that is ultimate in a lower sense, in some of his
works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world, yet this doth
not take place with regard to the works of providence in general; for God’s works of
providence in general, are the same with the general use to which he puts the world he has
made. And we may well argue from what we see of the general use which God makes of the
world, to the general end for which he designed the world. Though there may be some ends
of particular works of providence, that were not the last end of the creation, which are in
themselves grateful to God in such particular emergent circumstances, and so are last ends
in an inferior sense; yet this is only in certain cases, or particular occasions. But if they are
last ends of God’s proceedings in the use of the world in general, this shows that his making
them last ends does not depend on particular cases and circumstances, but the nature of
things in general, and his general design in the being and constitution of the universe.
Ninthly, If there be but one thing that is originally, and independent on any future sup-
posed cases, agreeable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can
be but one last end of God’s work, in this highest sense. But if there are various things,
properly diverse one from another, that are absolutely, and independently agreeable to the
Divine Being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were
several ultimate ends of the creation in that highest sense.
787
Introduction—Explanation of terms.