But that, said I, was not the
point in question. Most of your hearers will assent to the fact that
there will some day be a Resurrection, and that man will be brought
before the incorruptible tribunal the incorruptible tribunal. The
Judgment comes after the Resurrection (cf. 250 A, 254 A, 258 D),
and after the purifying and chastising detailed above. The
latter is represented by Gregory as a necessary process of
nature: but not till the Judgment will the moral value of each
life be revealed. There is no contradiction, such as Möller tries
to find, between this Dialogue and Gregory’s Oratio
Catechetica. There too he is speaking of chastisement after the
Resurrection and before the Judgment. “For not everything
that is granted in the resurrection a return to existence will return
to the same kind of life. There is a wide interval between those who
have been purified (i.e. by baptism) and those who still need
purification.”…“But as for those whose weaknesses
have become inveterate, and to whom no purgation of their defilement
has been applied, no mystic water, no invocation of the Divine power,
no amendment by repentance, it is absolutely necessary that they should
be submitted to something proper to their case,” i.e. to
compensate for Baptism, which they have never received (c.
35).; on account
both of the Scripture proofs, and also of our previous examination of
the question. But still the question remains φήσιν should
probably be struck out (as the insertion of a copyist encouraged
by εἶπον below):
five of Krabinger’s Codd. omit it.:
Is the state which we are to expect to be like the present state of the
body? Because if so, then, as I was saying εἶπον. Cf. 243
C: καὶ
ἅμα λεγειν
ἐπεχείρουν
ὅσα πρὸς
ἀνατροπὴν
τῆς
ἀναστάσεως
παρὰ τῶν
ἐριστικῶν
ἐφευρίσκεται. So that this is not the first occasion on which
objections to the Resurrection have been started by Gregory, and there
is no occasion to adopt the conjecture of Augentius and Sifanus,
ἂν εἴποιμι, “dixerim”, especially as εἶπον is found in all Codd. without exception.,
men had better avoid hoping for any Resurrection at all. For if our
bodies are to be restored to life again in the same sort of condition
as they are in when they cease to breathe, then all that man can look
forward to in the Resurrection is an unending calamity. For what
spectacle is more piteous than when in extreme old age our bodies
shrivel up Reading καταῤ&
191·ικνωθέντα and change into something repulsive
and hideous, with the flesh all wasted in the length of years, the skin
dried up about the bones till it is all in wrinkles, the muscles in a
spasmodic state from being no longer enriched with their natural
moisture, and the whole body consequently shrunk, the hands on either
side powerless to perform their natural work, shaken with an
involuntary trembling? What a sight again are the bodies of persons in
a long consumption! They differ from bare bones only in giving the
appearance of being covered with a worn-out veil of skin. What a sight
too are those of persons swollen with the disease of dropsy! What words
could describe the unsightly disfigurement of sufferers from leprosy ἱερᾷ
νόσῳ. That these words
can mean leprosy, as well as epilepsy, seems clear from
Eusebius.? Gradually over all their limbs and organs
of sensation rottenness spreads and devours them. What words could
describe that of persons who have been mutilated in earthquake, battle,
or by any other visitation, and live on in such a plight for a long
time before their natural deaths? Or of those who from an injury have
grown up from infancy with their limbs awry! What can one say of them?
What is one to think about the bodies of newborn infants who have been
either exposed, or strangled, or died a natural death, if they are to
be brought to life again just such as they were? Are they to continue
in that infantine state? What condition could be more miserable than
that? Or are they to come to the flower of their age? Well, but what
sort of milk has Nature got to suckle them again with? It comes then to
this: that, if our bodies are to live again in every respect the same
as before, this thing that we are expecting is simply a calamity;
whereas if they are not the same, the person raised up will be another
than he who died. If, for instance, a little boy was buried, but a
grown man rises again, or reversely, how can we say that the dead in
his very self is raised up, when he has had some one substituted for
him by virtue of this difference in age? Instead of the child, one sees
a grown-up man. Instead of the old man, one sees a person in his prime.
In fact, instead of the one person another entirely. The cripple is
changed into the able-bodied man; the consumptive sufferer into a man
whose flesh is firm; and so on of all possible cases, not to enumerate
them for fear of being prolix. If, then, the body will not come to life
again just such in its attributes as it was when it mingled with the
earth, that dead body will not rise again; but on the contrary the
earth will be formed into another man. How, then, will the Resurrection
affect myself, when instead of me some one else will come to life? Some
one else, I say; for how could I recognize myself when, instead of what
was once myself, I see some one not myself? It cannot really be I,
unless it is in every respect the same as myself. Suppose, for
instance, in this life I had in my memory the traits of some one; say
he was bald, had prominent lips, a somewhat flat nose, a fair
complexion, grey eyes, white hair, wrinkled skin; and then went to look
for such an one, and met a young man with a fine head of hair, an
aquiline nose, a dark complexion, and in all other respects quite
different in his type of countenance; am I likely in seeing the latter
to think of the former? But why dwell longer on these the less forcible
objections to the Resurrection, and neglect the strongest one of all?
For who has not heard that human life is like a stream, moving from
birth to death at a certain rate of progress, and then only ceasing from that
progressive movement when it ceases also to exist? This movement indeed
is not one of spacial change; our bulk never exceeds itself; but it
makes this advance by means of internal alteration; and as long as this
alteration is that which its name implies, it never remains at the same
stage (from moment to moment); for how can that which is being altered
be kept in any sameness? The fire on the wick, as far as appearance
goes, certainly seems always the same, the continuity of its movement
giving it the look of being an uninterrupted and self-centred whole;
but in reality it is always passing itself along and never remains the
same; the moisture which is extracted by the heat is burnt up and
changed into smoke the moment it has burst into flame and this
alterative force effects the movement of the flame, working by itself
the change of the subject-matter into smoke; just, then, as it is
impossible for one who has touched that flame twice on the same place,
to touch twice the very same flame to
touch twice the very same flame. Albert
Jahn (quoted by Krabinger) here remarks that Gregory’s comparison
rivals that of Heraclitus: and that there is a deliberate intention of
improving on the expression of the latter, “you cannot step twice
into the same stream.” Above (p. 459), Gregory has used directly
Heraclitus’ image, “so that Nature’s stream may not
flow on for ever, pouring forward in her successive births,”
&c. See also De Hom. Opif. c. 13 (beginning). (for the speed
of the alteration is too quick; it does not wait for that second touch,
however rapidly it may be effected; the flame is always fresh and new;
it is always being produced, always transmitting itself, never
remaining at one and the same place), a thing of the same kind is found
to be the case with the constitution of our body. There is influx and
afflux going on in it in an alterative progress until the moment that
it ceases to live; as long as it is living it has no stay; for it is
either being replenished, or it is discharging in vapour, or it is
being kept in motion by both of these processes combined. If, then, a
particular man is not the same even as he was yesterday not the same even as he was yesterday. Cf. Gregory’s Oratio de Mortuis, t. III. p. 633 A.
“It is not exaggeration to say that death is woven into our life.
Practically such an idea will be found by any one to be based on a
reality: for experiment would confirm this belief that the man of
yesterday is not the same as the man of today in material substance,
but that something of him must be alway becoming dead, or be growing,
or being destroyed, or ejected:…Wherefore, according to the
expression of the mighty Paul, ‘we die daily’: we are not
always the same people remaining in the same homes of the body, but
each moment we change from what we were by reception and ejectment,
altering continually into a fresh body.”, but is made different by this
transmutation, when so be that the Resurrection shall restore our body
to life again, that single man will become a crowd of human beings, so
that with his rising again there will be found the babe, the child, the
boy, the youth, the man, the father, the old man, and all the
intermediate persons that he once was. But further A
fresh objection is here started. It is answered (254 A, B).; chastity and profligacy are both carried on
in the flesh; those also who endure the most painful tortures for their
religion, and those on the other hand who shrink from such, both one
class and the other reveal their character in relation to fleshly
sensations; how, then, can justice be done at the Judgment Which
succeeds (and is bound up with) the Resurrection. The argument is,
“the flesh has behaved differently in different
persons here; how then can it be treated alike in all by being
allowed to rise again? Even before the judgment an injustice has been
done by all rising in the same way to a new life.”—In what
follows, ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
νῦν μὲν,
κ.τ.λ., the difficulty of
different dispositions in the same person is considered.?