the supposition. For if there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the in-
fluence of the cause under such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend
or follow the influence of the cause, or no; it might have followed, and it might not, when
the cause was the same, its influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And if
so, why did it follow, rather than not follow? Of this there is no cause or reason. Therefore
here is something without any cause or reason why it is, viz. the following of the effect on
the influence of the cause, with which it was not necessarily connected. If there be no neces-
sary connexion of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we may suppose that sometimes
the event will follow the cause, and sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in every
respect in the same state and circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this
strange phenomenon, even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follow, in
another not? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without any cause or ground.
Here is something in the present manner of the existence of things, and state of the world,
that is absolutely without a cause. Which is contrary to the supposition, and contrary to
what has been before demonstrated.
3. To suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their existence,
that yet are not necessarily connected with their cause, is to suppose that they have a cause
which is not their cause. Thus; if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause, with
its influence, and influential circumstances; then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible
and supposable, that the cause may sometimes exert the same influence, under the same
circumstances, and yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any instance,
this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause is not sufficient to produce
the effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would have done it. And yet, by the supposition,
in another instance, the same cause, with perfectly the same influence, and when all circum-
stances which have any influence are the same, it was followed with the effect. By which it
is manifest, that the effect in this last instance was not owing to the influence of the cause,
but must come to pass some other way. For it was proved before, that the influence of the
cause was not sufficient to produce the effect. And if it was not sufficient to produce it, then
the production of it could not be owing to that influence, but must be owing to something
else, or owing to nothing. And if the effect be not owing to the influence of the cause, then
it is not the cause. Which brings us to the contradiction of a cause, and no cause, that which
is the ground and reason of the existence of a thing, and at the same time is not the ground
and reason of its existence.
If the matter be not already so plain as to render any further reasoning upon it imper-
tinent, I would say, that which seems to be the cause in the supposed case, can be no cause;
its power and influence having, on a full trial, proved insufficient to produce such an effect:
and if it be not sufficient to produce it, then it does not produce it. To say otherwise, is to
say, there is power to do that which there is not power to do. If there be in a cause sufficient
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SECTION VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite…