Why Macrina’s answer must begin here, though the Paris Editt.
take no notice of a break. Krabinger on the authority of one of his
Codd. has inserted φησὶν ἡ
διδάσκαλος
after προνοητέον, either we must plan to keep the soul
absolutely untouched and free from any stain of evil; or, if our
passionate nature makes that quite impossible, then we must plan that
our failures in excellence consist only in mild and easily-curable
derelictions. For the Gospel in its teaching distinguishes between distinguishes between. The word here
is οἶδεν, which is
used of “teaching,” “telling,” after the
fashion of the later Greek writers, in making a quotation. a debtor of ten thousand talents and a
debtor of five hundred pence, and of fifty pence and of a farthing of
a farthing. No mention is made of this in
the Parable (S. Matt. xviii. 23;
S. Luke vii. 41). The “uttermost farthing” of S. Matt. v.
26 does not apply here., which is “the uttermost” of
coins; it proclaims that God’s just judgment reaches to all, and
enhances the payment necessary as the weight of the debt increases, and
on the other hand does not overlook the very smallest debts. But the
Gospel tells us that this payment of debts was not effected by the
refunding of money, but that the indebted man was delivered to the
tormentors until he should pay the whole debt; and that means nothing
else than paying in the coin of torment διὰ τῆς
βασάνου. Of
course διὰ
cannot go with ὀφειλὴν,
though Krabinger translates “per tormenta debita.” He has
however, with Oehler, pointed the Greek right, so as to take
ὄφλημα as in
opposition to ὀφειλὴν
the inevitable recompense, the recompense, I mean, that consists in
taking the share of pain incurred during his lifetime, when he
inconsiderately chose mere pleasure, undiluted with its opposite; so
that having put off from him all that foreign growth which sin is, and
discarded the shame of any debts, he might stand in liberty and
fearlessness. Now liberty is the coming up to a state which owns no
master and is self-regulating a
state which owns no master and is self-regulating, &c. He repeats this, De Hom. Opif. c. 4:
“For the soul immediately shows its royal and exalted character,
far removed from the lowliness of private station, in that it owns no
master, and is self-governed, swayed autocratically by its own
will,—for to whom else does this belong than to a king?”
and c. 16: “Thus, there is in us the principle of all excellence,
all virtue, and every higher thing that we conceive: but pre-eminent
among all is the fact that we are free from necessity, and not in
bondage to any natural force, but have decision in our power as we
please: for virtue is a voluntary thing, subject to no dominion:”
and Orat. Catech. c. 5: “Was it not, then, most right that
that which is in every detail made like the Divine should possess in
its nature a self-ruling and independent principle, such as to enable
the participation of the good to be the reward of its virtue?” It
would be possible to quote similar language from the Neoplatonists
(e.g. Plotinus vi. 83–6): but Gregory learnt the whole bearing
and meaning of moral liberty from none but Origen, whose so-called
“heresies” all flowed from his constant insistence on its
reality.; it is that with
which we were gifted by God at the beginning, but which has been
obscured by the feeling of shame arising from indebtedness. Liberty too
is in all cases one and the same essentially; it has a natural
attraction to itself. It follows, then, that as everything that is free
will be united with its like, and as virtue is a thing that has no
master, that is, is free, everything that is free will be united with
virtue. But, further, the Divine Being is the fountain of all virtue.
Therefore, those who have parted with evil will be united with Him; and
so, as the Apostle says, God will be “all in all This
(1
Cor. xv. 28) is a text much handled by the earlier Greek Fathers.
Origen especially has made it one of the Scripture foundations upon
which he has built up theology. This passage in Gregory should be
compared with the following in Origen, c. Cels. iv. 69, where he
has been speaking of evil and its origin, and its disappearance:
“God checks the wider spread of evil, and banishes it altogether
in a way that is conducive to the good of the whole. Whether or not
there is reason to believe that after the banishment of evil it will
again appear is a separate question. By later corrections, then, God
does put right some defects: for although in the creation of the whole
all the work was fair and strong, nevertheless a certain healing
process is needed for those whom evil has infected, and for the world
itself which it has as it were tainted; and God is never negligent in
interfering on certain occasions in a way suitable to a changeful and
alterable world,” &c. “He is like a husbandman
performing different work at different times upon the land, for a final
harvest.” Also viii. 72: “This subject requires much study
and demonstration: still a few things must and shall be said at once
tending to show that it is not only possible, but an actual truth, that
every being that reasons ‘shall agree in one law’ (quoting
Celsus’ words). Now while the Stoics hold that when the strongest
of the elements has by its nature prevailed over the rest, there shall
be the Conflagration, when all things will fall into the fire, we hold
that the Word shall some day master the whole of ‘reasoning
nature,’ and shall transfigure it to its own perfection, when
each with pure spontaneity shall will what it wishes, and act what it
wills. We hold that there is no analogy to be drawn from the case of
bodily diseases, and wounds, where some things are beyond the power of
any art of healing. We do not hold that there are any of the results of
sin which the universal Word, and the universal God, cannot heal. The
healing power of the Word is greater than any of the maladies of the
soul, and, according to the will, He does draw it to Himself:
and so the aim of things is that evil should be annihilated: whether
with no possibility whatever of the soul ever turning to it again, is
foreign to the present discussion. It is sufficient now to quote
Zephaniah” (iii.
7–13, LXX.).”; for this utterance seems to me
plainly to confirm the opinion we have already arrived at, for it means
that God will be instead of all other things, and in all. For while our
present life is active amongst a variety of multiform conditions, and
the things we have relations with are numerous, for instance, time,
air, locality, food and drink, clothing, sunlight, lamplight, and other
necessities of life, none of which, many though they be, are
God,—that blessed state which we hope for is in need of none of
these things, but the Divine Being will become all, and instead of all,
to us, distributing Himself proportionately to every need of that
existence. It is plain, too, from the Holy Scripture that God becomes,
to those who deserve it, locality, and home, and clothing, and food,
and drink, and light, and riches, and dominion, and everything
thinkable and nameable that goes to make our life happy. But He that
becomes “all” things will be “in all” things
too; and herein it appears to me that Scripture teaches the complete
annihilation of evil But,
when A. Jahn, as quoted by Krabinger asserts that Gregory and Origen
derived their denial of the eternity of punishment from a source
“merely extraneous,” i.e. the Platonists, we must
not forget that Plato himself in the Phædo, 113 F (cf. also
Gorgias, 525 C, and Republic, x. 615), expressly teaches
the eternity of punishment hereafter, for he uses there not the
word αἰ&
240·ν or αἰωνίος, but οὔποτε.
They were influenced rather by the late Platonists.. If, that is, God
will be “in all” existing things, evil; plainly, will not
then be amongst them; for if any one was to assume that it did exist
then, how will the belief that God will be “in all” be kept
intact? The excepting of that one thing, evil, mars the
comprehensiveness of the term “all.” But He that will be “in
all” will never be in that which does not exist.