to the state of the mind; and because in him benevolent influence counteracted passive power. Hence, when the
prince of this world came, he found nothing in him; and hence he rose to the greatest height of glory, having “a
name above every name.” 14. There is no end of objections and cavils, however demonstrative the proof; for
such there have been against all the first principles of religion—the being of God—a revelation of his will to that
human race—the doctrine of a future state, &c. &c. Some may say, Why should sin be made to originate in these
two things, liberty and passive power? We answer, it has been demonstrated, that all metaphysical, positive and
negative, causation, in reference to moral evil, is reducible to these two; and therefore they might as well ask.
Why one and one make two, rather than any other number? 15. Others may say, Why not proceed from God
alone? They might as well ask, Why is not the sun the cause of darkness? Love, the cause of enmity? Wisdom,
the cause of folly? Happiness, the cause of misery? Order, the cause of confusion? But the effect, it may be said,
is the same. We reply, the assignation of a cause, whether true or false, does not alter the nature of phenomena.
It would be, indeed, a strange phenomenon, hitherto unknown, and unknowable, for an hypothesis, however
demonstrable, to alter the nature of the things in question. The effect are the same. Very true. But the question
is not about the effects; the inquiry is about the true cause of those effects, in opposition to false philosophy.
The effect of moral evil is misery, or deserved suffering. Now does it make no difference, in justifying the ways
of God to men, whether a rational, immortal being suffer deservedly or undeservedly? To suffer for moral evil,
is to suffer deservedly; but were sin and suffering from God alone, or the effect of constituted laws, this could
not be the case. To say. that this partial suffering may be ultimately counterbalanced by a restoration, is begging
the question, that there will be a restoration And if there were, what is it better than an apology for past injustice?
To suffer undeservedly, is to suffer unjustly; and to punish at all is an act of injustice, if undeserved, as well as
to punish for ever. 16. It may be again asked, What advantage is there in fixing on this origin of moral evil, rather
than another? We reply by putting another question. Why should we put up with a false cause assigned for any
thing? Surely, phenomena more interesting, more alarming in their nature, and more awful in their consequences,
than moral evils, cannot arrest human observation. And it would be passing strange to suppose, that the ascer-
taining of their true cause and origin is not an important part of philosophy, and deserving of the closest invest-
igation. What can be more dishonourable to the moral character of Deity, than to make sin originate in his will
alone? Or, if this be its origin, how preposterous to call it moral evil, as distinguished from natural. How cruel
and unjust, beyond precedent, to punish it; and how absurd the idea of threatening punishment for what was
irreversibly appointed! 17. Some may say, Why may we not be satisfied with the idea of permission? If properly
understood, we acknowledge that this goes a considerable way. But we suspect, few seem acquainted with the
full implication of the term. God permits. True; if by it we mean he does not hinder. The free agent acts amiss
when he it not hindered. This only shows, that God might hinder if he pleased; but it assigns no cause why the
agent acts amiss. Permitting or not hindering, IMPLIES a cause distinct from divine causation. And the question
returns, what is the cause of sin taking place when not hindered? In vain do we fix on chance, or a self-determ-
ining power; these explain nothing, and in fact are nothing, as our author has demonstrated various ways. In
vain do we say. sin arises from the abuse of liberty. For the question recurs. What is the cause of that abuse? If
this be not explained, nothing is effected. In vain shall we say, it proceeds from the cause of causes. For that
cause is good only. From such a cause only good can proceed; and to ascribe sin to this cause is as proper as to
say that moral evil is a good thing, and ought to be rewarded rather than punished. If this be not a reprovable
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SECTION X. Concerning sin's first Entrance into the world.