names go, no equality of dignity accompanying their appellations. When, therefore, we have
learned all the names of the Son that are of lofty signification, we must bear in mind that
the honour which they imply is ascribed to Him only so far as the words go, but that, accord-
ing to the system of nomenclature which they adopt, He does not partake of the dignity
implied by the words.
But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries.
For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I seem to myself to be wearing
out the patience of my audience before we come to the brunt of the battle. These points,
then, I will leave it to my more learned hearers to dispose of, and proceed with my task. Nor
will I now notice a thing he has said, which, however, is closely connected with our inquiry;
viz. that these things have been so arranged that human thought and conception can claim
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no authority over names. But who is there that maintains that what is not seen in its own
subsistence has authority over anything? For only those creatures that are governed by their
own deliberate will are capable of acting with authority. But thought and conception are an
operation of the mind, which depends on the deliberate choice of those who speak, having
no independent subsistence, but subsisting only in the force of the things said. But this, he
says, belongs to God, the Creator of all things, who, by limitations and rules of relation,
operation, and proportion, applies suitable appellations to each of the things named. But
this either is sheer nonsense, or contradicts his previous assertions. For if he now professes
that God affixes names suitable to their subjects, why does he argue, as we have seen that
God bestows lofty names on things without honour, not allowing them a share in the dignity
which their names indicate, and again, that He degrades things of a lofty nature by names
without honour, their nature not being affected by the meanness of their appellations? But
perhaps we are unfair to him in subjecting his senseless collocation of phrases to such accus-
ations as these. For they are altogether alien to any sense (I do not mean only to a sense in
keeping with reverence), and they will be found to be utterly devoid of reason by all who
understand how to form an accurate judgment in such matters. Since, then, like the fish
called the sea-lung, what we see appears to have bulk and volume, which turns out, however,
to be only viscous matter disgusting to look at, and still more disgusting to handle, I shall
pass over his remarks in silence, deeming that the best answer to his idle effusions. For it
would be better that we should not inquire what law governs “operation,” and “proportion,”
and “relation,” and who it is that prescribes laws to God in respect to rules and modes of
proportion and relation, than that, by busying ourselves in such matters, we should nauseate
our hearers, and digress from more important matters of inquiry.
But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere
tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessarily close our argument, as
his writings will supply no material to work on. For as a smoke or a mist makes the air in
which it resides heavy and thick, and incapacitates the eye for the discharge of its natural
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.