7. In the first place, you yourselves, too,3437 see clearly that, if you ever discuss obscure
subjects, and seek to lay bare the mysteries of nature, on the one hand you do not know the
436
very things which you speak of, which you affirm, which you uphold very often with especial
zeal, and that each one defends with obstinate resistance his own suppositions as though
they were proved and ascertained truths. For how can we of ourselves know whether we3438
perceive the truth, even if all ages be employed in seeking out knowledge—we whom some
envious power3439 brought forth, and formed so ignorant and proud, that, although we
know nothing at all, we yet deceive ourselves, and are uplifted by pride and arrogance so as
to suppose ourselves possessed of knowledge? For, to pass by divine things, and those plunged
in natural obscurity, can any man explain that which in the Phædrus3440 the well-known
Socrates cannot comprehend—what man is, or whence he is, uncertain, changeable, deceitful,
manifold, of many kinds? for what purposes he was produced? by whose ingenuity he was
devised? what he does in the world? (C) why he undergoes such countless ills? whether the
earth gave life to him as to worms and mice, being affected with decay through the action
of some moisture;3441 or whether he received3442 these outlines of body, and this cast of
face, from the hand of some maker and framer? Can he, I say, know these things, which lie
open to all, and are recognisable by3443 the senses common to all,—by what causes we are
plunged into sleep, by what we awake? in what ways dreams are produced, in what they are
seen? nay rather—as to which Plato in the Theætetus3444 is in doubt—whether we are ever
3437 So Gelenius, followed by Canterus and Orelli, reading primum et ipsi, by rejecting one word of the ms.
(et quæ). Canterus plausibly combines both words into itaque—“therefore.” LB. reads ecquid—“do you at all,”
etc., with which Orelli so far agrees, that he makes the whole sentence interrogative.
3438 So restored by Stewechius; in the first ed. perspiciam (instead of am-us) “if I perceive the truth,” etc.
3439 So the ms. very intelligibly and forcibly, res…invida, but the common reading is invid-i-a—“whom
something…with envy.” The train of thought which is merely started here is pursued at some length a little
later.
3440 The ms. gives fedro, but all editions, except the first, Hildebrand, and Oehler, read Phædone, referring,
however, to a passage in the first Alcibiades (st. p. 129), which is manifestly absurd, as in it, while Alcibiades
“cannot tell what man is,” Socrates at once proceeds to lead him to the required knowledge by the usual dialectic.
Nourry thinks that there is a general reference to Phædr., st. p. 230,—a passage in which Socrates says that he
disregards mythological questions that he may study himself. [P. 447, note 2, infra.]
3441 Lit., “changed with the rottenness of some moisture.” The reference is probably to the statement by So-
crates (Phædo, st. p. 96) of the questions with regard to the origin of life, its progress and development, which
interested him as a young man.
3442 So the ms., LB., and Oehler, but the other edd. make the verb plural, and thus break the connection.
3443 Lit., “established in the common senses.”
3444 Arnobius overstates the fact here. In the passage referred to (Th., st. p. 158), Socrates is represented as
developing the Protagorean theory from its author’s standpoint, not as stating his own opinions.
Chapter VII.
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Chapter VII.