Chrys. rightly apprehends the incongruous logical form of the
argument in vii. 1–6. The Apostle
starts out with a general principle: “The law rules a man as long
as he lives.” It is a question of the man’s living
or dying not of the law’s. Now (v. 2.) he introduces in confirmation of this a specific example.
He takes the case of a woman who is “under the law of her
husband.” Here the "law of the husband must correspond to
ὁ νόμος of the
general principle; the γυνή to ὁ ἀνθρώπος (v. 1). That is, the
“husband” of the illustration corresponds to the
“law” of the general principle and the “woman”
of the illustration to the “man” of the principle. But
in v. 1, it is a question of
the man’s (not of the law’s) living or dying, while in the
illustration this order is reversed. Here it is a question of the
husband’s living or dying (who corresponds to the
“law”) and not of the wife’s, (who corresponds to the
“man” of v.
1).
How can this incongruity be explained? We answer that if Paul will use
the illustration from the dissolution of the marriage relation at all,
he can use it only as he has done. In order to make the illustration
harmonize in form with the principle (v. 1) and with the application (v. 4.) it would be necessary to suppose the wife as dying and
then marrying again after death—which is impossible;—so
that in order in any way to carry out the idea of the wife’s
marrying another (as illustrating the Christian’s becoming free,
as it were, from one husband—the law—and joining himself to
another—Christ), he must suppose the husband as dying and not the
wife. Nor can the thought which the apostle wishes to bring out (the
freedom to espouse another master) be brought out by adhering to the
form of verse 1. There it is the man
who dies and so gets free from the law, but with this figure it is
impossible to take the next step (which is necessary to the argument)
and say: He being dead to his former master, is free to take up
allegiance to another. In order to carry out the idea the thought
of verse 1 must change form and
represent as dying, not the person under authority, but the person
exercising it. The essential point of the argument is, that the
relation of the Christian to the Mosaic law is as fully terminated as
the marriage bond is by the death of one of the parties. There is in
each case a termination by death, this term being used of the
relation of the Christian to the law as a strong figure. (Cf.
Rom. vi. 6,
where the “death” is predicated of the man, and
Gal. vi. 14 where it is applied to both terms in the relation of the Christian
to the world: “By whom the world is crucified unto me and
I unto the world.”) The key to the whole passage is the
idea of death figuratively applied to the termination of the
Christian’s relation to the law, and its central thought is, that
having died to the law, we must live unto
Christ.—G.B.S.